of the application to adduce additional evidence on affidavit, but failed, presumably through oversight, to substitute any order for that of the Court of first instance. It would seem, however, from the tenor of the judgment of the Full Bench that it intended to substitute an order dismissing the application with 6 costs. Appellant applied to the Full Bench for leave to appeal to this Court. The application was opposed by respondent. The Full Bench granted leave and ordered respondent to pay the costs occasioned by its opposition. Before 1 consider the issues and arguments raised on appeal, it is necessary that I should recount the salient facts, as they appear from the affidavits. In this connection I should mention two points. Firstly, at the commencement of the hearing before us appellant's counsel informed the Court that he did not intend to argue the alleged passing off. I think counsel acted wisely for, in my opinion, appellant did not establish, 7 on the papers, a cause of action for passing off. It is thus not necessary, in retailing the facts, to refer to the evidence relating solely to passing off. Secondly, the affidavits reveal certain disputes of fact. The appellant nevertheless sought a final interdict, together with ancillary relief, on the papers and without resort to oral evidence. In such a case the general rule was stated by VAN WYK J (with whom DE VILLIERS JP and ROSENOW J concurred) in Stellenbosch Farmers' Winery Ltd v Stellenvale Winery (Pty) Ltd, 1957 (4) SA 234 (C) at p 235 E-G, to be: ".... where there is a dispute as to the facts a final interdict should only be granted in notice of motion proceedings if the facts as stated by the respondents 8.