UNTERHALTER AJ Infringement and section 13 of the Copyright Act [64] It was common ground between the parties that, apart from the dispute as to what section 13 of the Copyright Act permits or requires the Minister to do, the exclusive rights conferred upon owners of copyright that subsist in literary works has drastically restricted the availability of literary works in accessible format copies for the use of print and visually disabled persons. That is so because, on the undisputed evidence before us, the obligation to secure the authorisation of the owners of the copyright in literary works to make published literary works available in accessible format copies (the requirement of authorisation) has led to a scarcity of such works. Whether this comes about because authorisation is declined or on account of the difficulty and delay in identifying those from whom authorisation is required matters not. The effect is the same. Print and visually disabled persons struggle to access literary works in accessible format copies. Sometimes particular literary works are not available; sometimes the format is not optimal. More often, and particularly for poor persons in this class, the scarcity is absolute, and few works are available at all. [65] It takes little imagination to appreciate what that scarcity, relative or absolute, does for the life chances of those with print or visual disabilities. That some have nevertheless achieved substantial success is testament to their personal fortitude. It detracts not at all from the reality that those with print and visual disabilities suffer from a scarcity of access to literary works that persons without these impairments do not. [66] This scarcity goes to the heart of the constitutional challenge that Blind SA brings before this Court. The protection that the Copyright Act affords owners of copyright in literary works gives rise to a sharp disparity between those with print and visual disabilities, and those who do not suffer these impairments. Whatever limitations the exclusive rights conferred by the Copyright Act may cause to those without disabilities who would access literary works, they bear no comparison to the deprivations suffered by those with print and visual disabilities. The rights to incorporeal property that the Copyright Act protects may not become an instrument to disadvantage a class of persons who have the same need to have access to literary works 27