Cite as: 595 U. S. ____ (2022) 11 Opinion of the Court the central question is not whether the evidence in question was lawfully obtained but whether its disclosure would harm national-security interests. As the Court explained in Reynolds, the privilege applies where “there is a reasonable danger that compulsion of the evidence will expose military matters which, in the interest of national security, should not be divulged.” 345 U. S., at 10; see also, e.g., Zubaydah, ___ U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 7) (“The state-secrets privilege permits the Government to prevent disclosure of information when that disclosure would harm national security interests”); General Dynamics, 563 U. S., at 484 (noting that the privilege exists to serve the “sometimes-compelling necessity of governmental secrecy” over “military, intelligence, and diplomatic” information). We have never suggested that an assertion of the state secrets privilege can be defeated by showing that the evidence was unlawfully obtained. Second, in accordance with the fundamentally different inquiries called for under §1806(f ) and the state secrets privilege, the available relief also differs. Under §1806, a court has no authority to award any relief to an aggrieved person if it finds that the evidence was lawfully obtained, whereas a court considering an assertion of the state secrets privilege may order the disclosure of lawfully obtained evidence if it finds that disclosure would not affect national security (assuming that the information is otherwise subject to disclosure). And under §1806(f ), as interpreted by respondents, a court must award relief to an aggrieved person if it finds that the evidence was unlawfully obtained, but under the state secrets privilege, lawfulness is not determinative. In addition, the state secrets privilege, unlike §1806, sometimes authorizes district courts to dismiss claims on the pleadings. We need not delineate the circumstances in which dismissal is appropriate (or determine whether dis-