rigidly and without being willing to consider whether it should not be followed in the particular case." [31] Due to the above, the Petitioner can only approach the Court in respect of how the policy violated their rights and not the policy itself. The date the policy was enforced would be the date the alleged contravention had occurred and therefore the Petition is out of the 3month time limit as provided for by Rule 4 (1)(a). [32] With regards to the submission of a continuing violation, this Court agrees with the submissions of the Respondents that this is not a continuing violation and that the Petitioner had 3 months from receiving the letter regarding the censorship to approach the court to remedy any alleged violation. [33] Furthermore, the present case can be distinguished from Assemblies o{ God v Attorney General (CP 6 0(2019) [20201 SCCC 975 (22 December 2020), where a preliminary objection regarding the petition being out of time was dismissed as the Court found that violation was a continuing one. Firstly, the claim in Assemblies of God related to alleged infringement of right to freedom of conscience and religion, and right to property. The Court found the following in relation to the preliminary objection: "[25) In the current matter, the last correspondence regarding the appeal was sent to the Petitioner on 25 August 2014. The Ministry of Land Use and Housing wrote to the Petitioner informing them that the appeal had been considered and forwarded to the Appeal's Advisory Committeefor further processing. It is common cause that to date, the Petitioner has not received the outcome of that appeal. The appeal process has therefore not beenfinalised yet, since there is no decision. [26) Accordingly, the Petitioner was correct to rely on the reasoning in Talma. Since the decision in the appealproceedings has not yet been given, the potential breach of their rights is still continuing. Thus, following Talma, the second objection is dismissed. Thepetition is not time barred. (emphasis added) JJ 8 JJ