I also want to believe that even the requirement for the assignor to execute a deed or power of attorney as provided under article 4 of the Deeds of Assignment would only be relevant where PRS (UK) would be suing in the names of the assignor. All in all, it is the view of this court that the plaintiff was conferred with the power to commence and pursue any legal action in its name. As to whether the plaintiff has a cause of action is another issue to be determined in this suit but at least it is clothed with the power to bring an action in its names. All the authorities relied upon by counsel for the defendant are distinguishable from this case and irrelevant because they relate to plaintiffs who were suing as agents and not in their own rights. This answers the second issue in the affirmative. Issue 1: Whether the plaintiff has a cause of action. The guidelines on whether a plaint discloses a cause of action were stated by the Court of Appeal for East Africa in Auto Garage v Motokov (No. 3) [1971] EA 514 as follows: i. The plaint must show that the plaintiff enjoyed a right. ii. That right has been violated iii. That the defendant is liable. These are the three key ingredients of a cause of action that I will proceed to consider as subissues. i. Whether the plaintiff enjoyed a right. On this sub-issue, counsel for the plaintiff submitted that by virtue of the Deeds of Assignment signed by members of UB40, all economic and performing rights were vested in the PRS (UK) as the legal owner of the rights who then mandated the plaintiff to manage and enforce its rights in Uganda. According to the plaintiff, after assigning their rights, the members of UB40 no longer had any rights to transfer and to that extent could not exercise any ownership rights in the works in relation to public performance held in February 2008 in Kampala. The case of Performing Right Society Ltd v Harlequin Record Shops Ltd (1972) 2 All ER 828 was cited for the holding that where the original owner of the copyright assigns his works, he no longer owns the performing rights. As to whether the right has been violated and if the defendant was liable, counsel for the plaintiff argued that the copyrighted works which they seek to enforce were assigned to the PRS (UK) as provided for under section 14(1) (a) of the Act and under section 44(1) the defendant had to seek a license from the owner or owner’s agent before causing the works to be performed in public. It is the plaintiff’s case that the defendant ignored reminders from the plaintiff vide Exhibit P5(ii) 9