Judgment Approved by the court for handing down. Ali & Aslam v Channel 5 Broadcasting Ltd here were a good example of how relations between a landlord and tenant can break down, how the landlord had lost faith and trust in the tenant because of his failure to pay the rent and because of the extensive “back and forth in the county courts”; and in any event the film had given both tenant and landlord the opportunity to state their case about the facts. In paragraph 17, Mr Brinkworth went on to emphasise that the programme was “important to show precisely how High Court Writs of Possession are enforced ‘on the ground’” and that the programme informed the public, who had an interest in the work of the HCEAs as to “the nature of rent arrears and debt” and “the issues that non-payment bring”. 71. The second specific error really shades into the overall complaint, since it consists of the complaint that the judge confined editorial discretion to tone. 72. Likewise, the third complaint is that the judge took “judicial control of the emphasis or prominence of a particular matter of public interest”, and here Mr White was particularly critical of paragraph 196 of the judgement, summarised at paragraph 59 above, where the judge observed that the programme contained very little information about the relevant court processes. 73. The third particular Ground also feeds into the overall complaint. Under this Ground the Defendant complains that the judge introduced a “false dichotomy” in holding at paragraphs 195 and 210 of the judgment that the focus of the programme was not upon matters of public interest but on the drama of the conflict. 74. In our judgment, these complaints in truth converge, in a case where it is agreed there was a degree of legitimate public interest in the subject matter of the programme, into the proposition that the judge interfered too far with the legitimate exercise of editorial discretion in balancing the Article 8 and Article 10 rights. He took too narrow a view of what was in the public interest, effectively confining it to the High Court process. And, in particular, wrongly concluded in an itemised, or overparticular sense, that the publication of each specific piece of information in respect of which the Claimants had a legitimate expectation of privacy had to be justified as a matter of general public interest. 75. In reply, on behalf of the Claimants, Mr Tomlinson advanced three principles. Firstly, some public interest does not justify any interference with privacy. Secondly, editorial discretion does not justify invasion of privacy. And, thirdly that at the margin, creating a “better story” cannot justify an invasion of privacy. 76. The Claimants accept that presenting a story in a particular way could have a bearing on questions of public interest. But here Mr Tomlinson emphasised that the judge found all of the interferences with the Claimants’ privacy to be unjustified. A fair reading of his conclusion in paragraph 195 was that he was reaching an overall conclusion in respect of the whole approach taken to the programme. 77. The specific complaint that the judge had paid no attention or no sufficient attention to the unchallenged evidence of Mr Brinkworth as to the inclusion of this material was contradicted by the judge’s conclusions in paragraph 196, where he noted that the programme contained “no information about the legal processes involved”. The supposed “false dichotomy” advanced under the third ground of cross-appeal did not exist. The conflict between the Claimants and the Ahmeds was not, and could not be,