(H) The Majority Opinion intend to broadly view justifications stipulated in Article 310 of the Criminal Act for the purpose of achieving harmony with the freedom of expression after viewing that even an act of expression performed in a private relationship and space to protect an individual’s reputation corresponds to constituent elements. However, this also culminates in leaning toward the protection of an individual’s reputation and reveals nothing beyond evasion to maintain the theory of propagation possibility. No matter how broadly justifications stipulated in Article 310 of the Criminal Act are viewed, the remark ought to be punished as criminal defamation unless there is publicity in its main purpose and contents. Not only is there a question about how many cases where a private conversation in a private space has publicity exist, but requiring publicity is the same as prohibiting private conversations regarding personal subjects. The entire nation cannot avoid criminal punishment except wishing for good luck that the contents of private conversations are not revealed to the victim. This leads to viewing the entire nation as either potential criminals or those who have not yet been detected. [2] [Majority Opinion] In the case where the criminal defendant was charged with defaming Party A by publicly alleging facts by exclaiming aloud, “that person is an exconvict who has served out his/her sentence,” to Party A, while Party B, the husband of the criminal defendant, and Party C, a relative of Party A, were listening on a back street of Party A’s house, comprehensively considering that: (1) the criminal defendant and Party A, as neighbors, are in a conflicting relationship due to various issues and the criminal defendant made the aforementioned remark in the process of arguing with Party A on that day; (2) as Party B and Party D, the wife of Party A, overheard the criminal defendant and Party A arguing in a loud voice, they exited their respective houses, and Party A and Party D consistently stated to the effect that “the criminal defendant loudly spoke that Party A was an ex-convict and villagers as well as Party C heard it”; (3) the criminal defendant declared aloud that “Party A was a vicious exconvict” even in front of a police officer who was dispatched after receiving a report several times; even though the place in which Party A lives was a clan village with the same surname as Party A and Party C, and Party A has a previous conviction, Party C is not seen as being in a close relationship with Party A by inference of the statement that Party C “heard the fact that Party A was an ex-convict for the first time from the criminal defendant,” the case holding that considering the degree of acquaintance