OOO MEMO v. RUSSIA JUDGMENT
actions of the Administration to halt the payment of subsidies to the Town of
Volgograd [had been] an act of revenge on the part of the Administration of
the Volgograd Region” and noted that the applicant company had not
furnished any documentary proof in support of the impugned “statements of
fact”. Before the domestic courts, the applicant company had not provided
“any information concerning the reliability of the source of the information
used, his qualifications, and [had] not file[d] any motions to examine
witnesses, request for the evidence that could confirm the reliability of
circumstances stated in the article”.
31. The Government insisted that the interference corresponded to a
“pressing social need” and noted that the first-instance court had “held that
the reference to lobbying the specific legal entity and revenge on the part of
[a body of the] executive authority in itself [had] damaged the business
reputation of the Administration of the Volgograd Region, as it [had been]
perceived by the mass Internet users as its involvement in an unclean and
unethical behaviour – though not constituting a crime and not [being in
violation of] the law – but disapproved by society.”
32. The Government refuted the applicant company’s claim that the
impugned statements had in fact been value judgments of Mr S. and
concluded that “the domestic court rightfully established the affirmative
nature of the information disseminated and not confirmed by the evidence.”
2. The Court’s assessment
33. While it is not in dispute between the parties that the judgment of the
District Court of 8 April 2009 upheld on 16 July 2009 by the Moscow City
Court constituted an interference with the applicant company’s right to
freedom of expression, the parties have disagreed as to whether the
interference in question was “prescribed by law”, whether it pursued a
“legitimate aim” within the meaning of Article 10 § 2 of the Convention, and
whether it was proportionate to the aim sought (see paragraphs 26 and 29
above).
(a) Whether the interference was “prescribed by law”
34. The Court notes that the wording employed in Article 152 of the
Russian Civil Code as in force at the material time conferred the right to bring
civil defamation proceedings to a citizen entitled to the protection of her/his
honour, dignity, and business reputation. Its provisions, in so far as they
concerned business reputation, were made expressly applicable to legal
persons (see paragraph 19 above). Given that the Administration of the
Volgograd Region is a legal entity (see paragraph 6 above), and despite the
lack of an established national jurisprudence on the “business reputation” of
public authorities, the Court is prepared to accept that the interference
complained of was “prescribed by law”.
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