circumstances, that counsels have primarily addressed the Court. Further, none of the Defendants have any objection for blocking the URLs for the territory of India i.e., the India domain. Submissions on behalf of the Plaintiff 8. On behalf of the Plaintiffs, Mr. Darpan Wadhwa, ld. Senior Counsel submits that if a defamatory article, book or any other content is printed or published, then the publisher of the same is liable for defamation. The Defendants are seeking protection under Section 79 of the Information Technology Act, 2000 (hereinafter ‗the Act‘) on the ground that they are intermediaries. Since they claim that their role is that of passive intermediaries, they are bound to follow the due diligence required under law. As per the judgment in Shreya Singhal v Union of India AIR 2015 SC 1523, the phrase “actual knowledge” in Section 79 is a Court order, thus, once the Court passes an order, they are bound to disable the content globally and cannot raise objections to the geographical extent of implementation of the injunction. It is Mr. Wadhwa‟s submission that if the Defendants claim that they do not have an obligation to comply with the orders of the Court, then they are no longer entitled to safe harbour under Section 79 of the Act. He relies on the definitions of “computer resource”, “computer system”, “computer network” and “data” in Sections 2(1)(k), 2(1)(l), 2(1)(j) and 2(1)(o) respectively to submit that the Act does not provide that the blocking has to be restricted to the territory of India. Thus, a Court of competent jurisdiction can pass effective orders directing global blocking. He further submits that an intermediary‟s role cannot be to adjudicate as to whether the content is defamatory or not, but to remain CS (OS) 27/2019 Page 5 of 76