03/02/2020 Privacy International v Secretary of State for Foreign And Commonwealth Affairs & Ors (Rev 2) [2016] UKIPTrib 15_110-CH (17 October 2016) "94 - Directions in the interests of national security, etc. (1) The Secretary of State may, after consultation with a person to whom this section applies, give to that person such directions of a general character as appear to the Secretary of State to be necessary [requisite or expedient] in the interests of national security or relations with the government of a country or territory outside the United Kingdom. (2) If it appears to the Secretary of State to be necessary [requisite or expedient] to do so in the interests of national security or relations with the government of a country or territory outside the United Kingdom, he may, after consultation with a person to whom the section applies, give to that person a direction requiring him (according to the circumstances of the case) to do, or not to do, a particular thing specified in the direction. 10. In the April Response, the Respondents gave the following account in relation to BCD:"7) Both GCHQ and ... MI5 acquire Bulk Communications Data pursuant to directions made under s.94 of the 1984 Act.  For the avoidance of doubt, [MI6] do not do so. GCHQ 8) [In 1998 and then regularly] since 2001, GCHQ has sought and obtained from successive Foreign Secretaries a number of s.94 directions relating to the ongoing provision of various forms of bulk communications data.  In keeping with GCHQ's external intelligence mission, the datasets received under these directions are predominantly foreign-focussed, and the data acquired is accordingly in most cases only a fraction of that possessed by the [PECN's]. 9) The data involved is held by GCHQ and ingested into their broader data holdings, where it is merged with communications data intercepted under the authority of external warrants issued in accordance with s.8(4) of RIPA.  The s.94 data represents a more reliable and comprehensive feed of particular types of communication data than may usually be obtained from interception.  The intelligence value of the s.94 data is derived from the merger with GCHQ's wider datasets, thus enriching the results of analytic queries made on those systems. 10) Such analysis of bulk communications data is vital for identifying and developing intelligence targets.  Approximately 5 per cent of GCHQ's original intelligence reporting is based wholly or partly on s.94 data. MI5 11) Since 2005 successive Home Secretaries have issued and/or decided to maintain directions under s.94 of the 1984 Act requiring a number of [PECN's] to provide MI5 with ... communications data in the interests of national security.  The data obtained is aggregated in a database.  Successive Home Secretaries have agreed that they would keep these arrangements under review at six-monthly intervals.  The review process involves a detailed submission being made to the Home Office by MI5, setting out the ongoing case for the database, including specific examples of its usefulness in the intervening period and setting out any errors in the use of the database, which have occurred in that time.  The Home Secretary considers the submission with the advice and assistance of Senior Home Office officials. 12) The communications data provided by the [PECNs] under the s.94 directions is limited to "traffic data" and "Service Use Information". 13) The data provided does not contain communication content or Subscriber Information (information held or obtained by a [PECN] about persons to whom the [PECN] provides or has provided communication services).  The data provided is therefore anonymous.  It is www.bailii.org/cgi-bin/format.cgi?doc=/uk/cases/UKIPTrib/2016/15_110-CH.html&query=([2016])+AND+(UKIPTrib)+AND+(15_110-CH) 5/53