application is by notice of motion, however it is not made ex parte and indeed rule of Order 37 rule 3 provides ―The court shall in all cases, before granting an injunction, direct notice of the application be given to the opposite party.‖ It would appear that this rule is mandatory. The second possible procedure appears to be under The Copyright Act (Cap 215). Section 13 of the said Act provides the following remedies for infringement ―S. 13 (2) (b) an Injunction to restrain further infringement or where no infringement has yet occurred to restrain any infringement (c) an Injunction requiring the delivering up to the court and the destruction or other disposal as court may direct of copies of the works in question; or other articles, which have been, or may otherwise be, used for the purposes of infringement‖ Section 13 of the Copyright Act therefore provides a direct statutory prohibitory injunction that is also available to the Applicant. Indeed Section 13 of the Copyright lends itself well to the remedy of injunction. The procedure under Section 13 of the Copyright Act is not elaborate enough as no rules have been made under the section. Under such a situation it would have been possible to combine section 13 of The Copyright Act and section 39(2) of the Judicature Act to make an application before court. I find that in this particular case an application made ex parte for temporary injunction pending the disposal of the main suit under sections 38 and 39(2) alone is not sufficient to cloth the court with the legal authority to grant order. Even in the Microsoft Corporation Case (Supra) at 129 which is a Kenyan Case from a Country with fairly similar laws and procedures to Uganda, it appears the application there was for a prohibitory as opposed to a temporary injunction for which an interim order was given (see p.130). Injunctions are largely equitable remedies, which are given at the discretion of the court. In so granting the injunction the courts must have regard