Price v. City of N.Y. 15 Civ. 5871 (KPF) (S.D.N.Y. Jun. 25, 2018) not amount to a deprivation of her liberty interest." (Def. Br. 16 (relying exclusively on Burg v. Gosselin, 591 F.3d 95 (2d Cir. 2010)).6 The Court pending long after she believed it to have been dismissed — she again appeared in court, where the charge was dismissed. (FAC ¶¶ 59-61).7 disagrees. During the entire pendency of the prosecution, she remained subject to New York Criminal Procedure Law § 510.40, which states that "[u]pon ordering that a principal be released on [her] own recognizance, the court must direct [her] to appear in the criminal action or proceeding involved whenever [her] attendance may be required and to render [herself] at all times amenable to the orders and processes of the court." N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 510.40. 6 The City Defendants' reliance on Burg is puzzling, as "there was no claim for malicious prosecution in Burg," Swartz v. Insogna, 704 F.3d 105, 112 (2d Cir. 2013) — an important fact that they fail to mention. 19 The Second Circuit has "consistently held," most recently in Swartz v. Insogna, "that a postarraignment defendant who is 'obligated to appear in court in connection with [criminal] charges whenever [her] attendance [i]s required' suffers a Fourth Amendment deprivation of liberty." 704 F.3d at 112 (quoting Murphy v. Lynn, 118 F.3d 938, 947 (2d Cir. 1997) (finding that postarraignment requirements that plaintiff appear for court appearances and not leave the state were sufficient to implicate the Fourth Amendment)). Thus, "the requirement that a plaintiff appear in court, post-arraignment, in connection with criminal proceedings, does constitute [a deprivation of liberty]." MacPherson v. Town of Southampton, No. 07 Civ. 3497 (DRH) (AKT), 2013 WL 6058202, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 2013). Courts have found a liberty deprivation, for example, where arrestees were arraigned and were subsequently required to make one other court appearance. See Willis v. City of New York, No. 12 Civ. 5259 (RA), 2015 WL 556884, at *8 n.9 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 2015) (finding liberty depravation in context of § 1983 malicious prosecution claim); see also Gogol v. City of New York, No. 15 Civ. 5703 (ER), *19 2017 WL 3449352, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 2017) (finding liberty interest in context of § 1983 fair trial claim). In this case, Plaintiff alleges that after she received the desk appearance ticket, she was released from custody, appeared in court about a month after the ticket was issued, and about six years later — when she learned that the prosecution remained 7 The City Defendants repeatedly, and erroneously, state that Plaintiff only appeared in court once. (See Def. Br. 1617; Def. Reply 6-7). The FAC makes clear that Plaintiff appeared in court twice. 20 In Rohman, the Second Circuit recognized that under § 510.40, an arrestee released on her own recognizance "must ordinarily remain in the state." 215 F.3d at 216; see also Perez v. Duran, 962 F. Supp. 2d 533, 542 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) ("[T]he plaintiff's release on his own recognizance necessarily required the plaintiff to comply with travel restrictions."). The restrictions on Plaintiff's travel, which operated as a de facto confinement within the state and remained in place as long as Plaintiff was released on her own recognizance, *20 are therefore sufficient to implicate the Fourth Amendment and constitute a seizure. See Rohman, 215 F.3d at 216; Murphy, 118 F.3d at 947; Gogol, 2017 WL 3449352, at *11. Accordingly, the Court denies the motion to dismiss the individualcapacity claims against Simmons.8 8 Simmons did not argue that she was entitled to qualified immunity, and that argument is therefore waived. Even if she did, the argument would fail. Reasonably competent officers understand that it is unlawful to initiate a prosecution against a domestic violence victim for allegedly filing a false report when there was no reason to believe the report was false and 9