MADLANGA J Justice – a member of the Executive – without the involvement of any other person or entity. And in practice, terms of designated Judges have been renewed. Also, the lack of specificity on the manner of appointment and extensions of terms raises independence concerns. As Justice Alliance tells us, the power to extend the term of a Judge goes to the core of the tenure of the judicial office, judicial independence and the separation of powers, and that open-ended discretion in respect of appointments may raise a reasonable apprehension or perception that the independence of the Judge may be undermined by external interference by the Executive.137 It is so that the Minister does not appoint a designated Judge as a Judge, but rather as a designated Judge; the designated Judge is already a Judge. But the point is that – based on Thint138 and Van der Merwe139 – the requirement of independence is a constitutional imperative. And there may be factors that conduce to a perception of lack of independence even in the case of a Judge. That, indeed, was one of the underlying bases even for the Justice Alliance ratio (basis for a decision). The designation by a member of the Executive in ill-defined circumstances or circumstances that completely lack description does not conduce to a reasonable perception of independence. [93] Additionally, directions are sought and issued in complete secrecy, and, therefore, without public scrutiny, or the possibility of review or appeal, which points to a lack of “mechanisms for accountability and oversight”.140 My reference to lack of review has in mind not those instances where the subject of RICA surveillance may fortuitously become aware of her or his surveillance. All of these considerations indicate the lack of structural, operational and perceived independence of the designated Justice Alliance above n 129 at para 65, where this Court stated that “[t]he power to extend the term of a Constitutional Court judge goes to the core of the tenure of the judicial office, judicial independence and the separation of powers”. 137 138 Thint above n 116 at para 83. 139 Van Der Merwe above n 58 at paras 36-8. 140 Glenister II above n 121 at para 210. However, in Helen Suzman Foundation v President of the Republic Of South Africa [2014] ZACC 32; 2015 (2) SA 1 (CC); 2015 (1) BCLR 1 (CC) at para 31, Mogoeng CJ held that reference to public confidence could not have been intended to mean that public opinion must from time to time be solicited to determine what the public thinks of the independence of an institution. The overriding consideration is whether the legislation has inbuilt autonomy-protecting features to enable its members to carry out their duties without any inhibitions or fear of reprisals. 53