JAFTA J the meaning to be adopted even if it is at odds with any other meaning in other statutes.”190 [176] RICA replaces the Interception and Monitoring Prohibition Act. A perusal of the latter Act reveals that in addition to the definition section, the Act dedicates a specific provision in its body to the Minister’s power to designate. Section 3 stipulates in an inelegant manner that an interception direction may be issued only by a Judge designated by the Minster. This is lacking in RICA. On the respondents’ approach to the construction of the definition section, section 3 of RICA’s predecessor was superfluous because the Minister’s power was derived from the definition itself. [177] I am not aware of any decision which used a definition section for purposes other than applying its meanings to the defined words wherever they appear in the text of a statute. I can think of no cogent reasons for treating the definition of a designated Judge in RICA as a source of the Minister’s implied power to designate a Judge. To do otherwise suggests to me that the definition section in RICA is used for a purpose other than the one it was meant to serve. That purpose is to give meaning to the words “designated judge” and nothing more. Implied power [178] In GNH Office Automation,191 the Supreme Court of Appeal quoted the following description of implied power in our law: “Powers may be presumed to have been impliedly conferred because they constitute a logical or necessary consequence of the powers which have been expressly conferred, because they are reasonably required in order to exercise the powers expressly conferred, or because they are ancillary or incidental to those expressly conferred.”192 190 Id at para 16-8. 191 GNH Office Automation CC v Provincial Tender Board, Eastern Cape [1998] ZASCA 25; 1998 (3) SA 45 (SCA). 192 Id at 51G-H. 88