JAFTA J the implied power to dismiss was the corollary of the power to appoint. In those matters, both kinds of power vested in the same functionary. [186] For all these reasons I conclude that here the power to designate a Judge is not expressly or impliedly conferred by RICA. As mentioned, this conclusion has a bearing on the remedy proposed in the first judgment. [187] But before addressing the question of remedy, it is necessary to express a view on the validity of the impugned provisions. While the applicants acknowledge that the right to privacy, on which they rely for their challenge, is not absolute, they contend that the limitation of that right by the relevant provisions of RICA is not reasonable and justifiable. Their attack is directed mainly at Chapter 3 of RICA which authorises interception of private communications by public officials. As the first judgment illustrates, the interception of communications which are not authorised by this Chapter are unlawful. [188] Such interceptions primarily limit the right to privacy guaranteed by section 14 of the Constitution.199 This section pledges privacy of communications. The limitation imposed by Chapter 3 of RICA on this right may be constitutionally permissible only if it is reasonable and justifiable. The respondents bore the onus of proving this fact. In an attempt to justify the limitation, the Minister of Justice contended, in an affidavit filed on his behalf, that the designation of a Judge to authorise the interception safeguards the privacy of the affected parties. He submitted that “the appointment of the designated judge is governed by the Judges’ Remuneration and Conditions of Employment Act” which provides that retired Judges must be available to perform 199 Section 14 of the Constitution provides: “Everyone has the right to privacy, which includes the right not to have— (a) their person or home searched; (b) their property searched; (c) their possessions seized; or (d) the privacy of their communications infringed.” 91