JAFTA J might work the gravest injustice by including cases which were not intended to be included.”185 [162] As it appears from this statement, courts have declined to apply the defined meaning where the result would be an injustice or absurdity which could not have been intended. What is important to note is that the application of a definition section is discretionary. Where it is clear that adherence to a statutory definition would lead to an injustice or absurdity, a court is entitled to depart from the defined meaning and assign the relevant words their ordinary meaning. This discretion does not extend to other provisions of a statute. [163] Here a court that interprets RICA has a discretion to apply the meanings defined in section 1, including the meaning of “designated judge”. If it appears to that Court that giving the phrase “designated judge” its defined meaning would lead to an injustice or absurdity, the court would be entitled to jettison the defined meaning and opt for the ordinary meaning, if it differs from the defined meaning. That this was what Parliament had envisaged is apparent from the wording of section 1 itself. [164] In the relevant part section 1 of the RICA reads: “(1) In this Act, unless the context otherwise indicates— ‘designated judge’ means any judge of a High Court discharged from active service under section 3(2) of the UNIFORM COURT RULES Remuneration and Conditions of Employment Act, 2001 (Act 47 of 2001), or any retired judge, who is designated by the Minister to perform the functions of a designated judge for purposes of this Act.” [165] Under this section the words “designated judge” wherever they appear in RICA mean a retired Judge designated to perform functions of such Judge for purposes of the Act. Indeed these words appear on a number of occasions in RICA186. Whenever 185 Town Council of Springs v Moosa 1929 AD 401 at 417. 186 The words “designated judge” appear in sections 16, 17, 18 and 20 of the RICA. 83