JAFTA J ‘In this Act, unless the context otherwise indicates – “university” means any university established, deemed to be established or declared as a university under this Act.’ It follows that the special meaning given to ‘university’ in that Act is confined to instances where the Higher Education Act itself applies. But, even then, the definition applies subject to context. Room is left for the word ‘university’ to be given a meaning that is at variance with that specially defined one even where the Higher Education Act applies. And this is in line with our jurisprudence. In Liesching I we said: ‘“Appeal” is defined in section 1 of the Superior Courts Act. Where a word is defined in a statute, the meaning ascribed to it by the Legislature must prevail over its ordinary meaning. The definition makes plain that the word ‘appeal’ would only bear the meaning ascribed to it by the Legislature if the context so requires. If, however, there are compelling reasons, based on the context, to disregard the ascribed meaning then the ordinary meaning of the word must be used. If a defined word or phrase is used more than once in the same statute it must be given the same meaning unless the statutory definition would result in such injustice or incongruity or absurdity as to lead to the conclusion that the Legislature could never have intended the statutory definition to apply.’ To concretise this approach, the following must never be lost sight of. First, a special meaning ascribed to a word or phrase in a statute ordinarily applies to that statute alone. Second, even in instances where that statute applies, the context might dictate that the special meaning be departed from. Third, where the application of the definition, even where the same statute in which it is located applies, would give rise to an injustice or incongruity or absurdity that is at odds with the purpose of the statute, then the defined meaning would be inappropriate for use and should therefore be ignored. Fourth, a definition of a word in the one statute does not automatically or compulsorily apply to the same word in another statute. Fifth, a word or phrase is to be given its ordinary meaning unless it is defined in the statute where it is located. Sixth, where one of the meanings that could be given to a word or expression in a statute, without straining the language, ‘promotes the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights’, then that is 87