MADLANGA J lawyer-client communications without any recognition of this legal, indeed constitutional, reality would be at odds with the rule of law. [118] This would not be an isolated carve out. Canada’s section 186(2) of the Criminal Code151 prohibits authorisation of an interception “at the office or residence of a solicitor” without “reasonable grounds to believe that the solicitor” or his associates are about to commit an offence. And the United Kingdom’s Interception of Communications Code of Practice pursuant to section 71 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 establishes stringent safeguards where the communications intercepted may be of a confidential nature, including journalistic or legally privileged communications.152 [119] In sum, the confidentiality of lawyer-client communications and journalists’ sources is particularly significant in our constitutional dispensation. There is thus a need that special consideration be given to this fact when interception directions are sought and granted. Plainly there are means that may help minimise this particularly egregious form of intrusion into privacy; particularly egregious because of its impact on other constitutional rights.153 Some of the foreign examples tell us as much. While reference to them should not be seen as dictation to Parliament, they serve as examples of less restrictive means, which do not subvert the purpose of RICA. RICA is thus unconstitutional to the extent that, when the intended subject of surveillance is a practising lawyer or a journalist, it fails to provide for additional safeguards calculated to minimise the risk of infringement of the confidentiality of practising lawyer and client communications and journalists’ sources. 151 R.S.C., 1985, c. C-46. 152 For example, where legally privileged communications may be intercepted, the application for an interception warrant should include an assessment of how likely it is that communications which are subject to legal privilege will be intercepted, and whether one of the purposes of interception is to obtain privileged communications. If so, the Secretary of State will only issue the warrant if there are exceptional and compelling circumstances (see paras 9.48-9.63). And where journalistic material is intended to be intercepted, the reasons should be clearly stipulated and specific necessity and proportionality of doing so should be carefully considered. Once intercepted, communications should then be retained only where necessary and proportionate to do so, for an authorised purpose under section 15(4) of the Act (see paras 9.74-9.88 of the Code). 153 That is, its impact on rights guaranteed under sections 16(1), 34 and 35(3) of the Constitution. 63