22 MOODY v. NETCHOICE, LLC Opinion of the Court unabashedly control the content that will appear to users, exercising authority to remove, label or demote messages they disfavor.5 Except that Texas’s law limits their power to do so. As noted earlier, the law’s central provision prohibits the large social-media platforms (and maybe other entities 6) from “censor[ing]” a “user’s expression” based on its “viewpoint.” §143A.002(a)(2); see supra, at 7. The law defines “expression” broadly, thus including pretty much anything that might be posted. See §143A.001(2). And it defines “censor” to mean “block, ban, remove, deplatform, demonetize, deboost, restrict, deny equal access or visibility to, or otherwise discriminate against expression.” §143A.001(1).7 That is a long list of verbs, but it comes down to this: The platforms cannot do any of the things they typically do (on their main feeds) to posts they disapprove—cannot demote, label, or remove them—whenever the action is based on the —————— 5 We therefore do not deal here with feeds whose algorithms respond solely to how users act online—giving them the content they appear to want, without any regard to independent content standards. See post, at 2 (BARRETT, J., concurring). Like them or loathe them, the Community Standards and Community Guidelines make a wealth of user-agnostic judgments about what kinds of speech, including what viewpoints, are not worthy of promotion. And those judgments show up in Facebook’s and YouTube’s main feeds. 6 The scope of the Texas law, a matter crucial to the facial inquiry, is unsettled, as previously discussed. See supra, at 10–11. The Texas solicitor general at oral argument stated that he understood the law to cover Facebook and YouTube, but “d[id]n’t know” whether it also covered other platforms and applications. Tr. of Oral Arg. in No. 22–555, pp. 61– 62. 7 In addition to barring “censor[ship]” of “expression,” the law bars “censor[ship]” of people. More specifically, it prohibits taking the designated “censor[ial]” actions against any “user” based on his “viewpoint,” regardless of whether that “viewpoint is expressed on a social media platform.” §§143A.002(a)(1), (b); see supra, at 7. Because the Fifth Circuit did not focus on that provision, instead confining its analysis to the law’s ban on “censor[ing]” a “user’s expression” on the platform, we do the same.