USCA Case #19-7030 Document #1844360 Filed: 05/27/2020 Page 3 of 4 -3accommodations.” D.C. CODE § 2-1402.31(a); see also id. § 2-1401.02(24). Relying on a D.C. Court of Appeals case interpreting that statute, U.S. Jaycees v. Bloomfield, 434 A.2d 1379 (D.C. 1981), the district court concluded that only physical places within the District of Columbia qualify as “places of public accommodation.” Freedom Watch, 368 F.Supp.3d at 39. Because Freedom Watch had not alleged that the Platforms operated out of a particular place in D.C., but only that they do business in the District, the district court dismissed the claim. Id. On appeal, Freedom Watch contests the district court’s interpretation of “place of public accommodations.” It is joined by the District of Columbia, which submitted an amicus brief on this issue. The District of Columbia argues that the district court’s reliance on Jaycees is misplaced. It contends that Jaycees is not authoritative because it was a decision on a preliminary injunction rather than a final decision on the merits and that the D.C. Commission on Human Rights has interpreted the Human Rights Act to reject a physical location requirement, Pool & Geller v. Boy Scouts of America, Nos. 93-030-(PA) & 93-031-(PA) (D.C. Comm’n on Human Rights June 18, 2001). When interpreting D.C. law, we strive “to achieve the same outcome we believe would result if the District of Columbia Court of Appeals considered this case.” Novak v. Capital Mgmt. & Dev. Corp., 42 F.3d 902, 907 (D.C. Cir. 2006). The D.C. Court of Appeals in Jaycees held that “places of public accommodation” under the D.C. Human Rights Act must operate from a “particular place”. Jaycees, 434 A.2d at 1381–82. The arguments to the contrary are unsuccessful. The District of Columbia argues that Jaycees is not binding, because it was a decision on a preliminary injunction and thus not a final legal conclusion. See University of Texas v. Camenisch, 41 U.S. 390, 395 (1981). Maybe so. But the D.C. Court of Appeals has interpreted this statute and at minimum, its interpretation is a reasonable one. We have no basis to believe it would reach a different conclusion on reconsideration. The Pool & Geller decision does not alter this analysis because the D.C. Court of Appeals reversed the Commission’s decision, although it explicitly declined in that case to consider what qualified as a “place of public accommodation.” See Boy Scouts of Am. v. D.C. Comm’n on Human Rights, 809 A.2d 1192, 1196 n.4 (D.C. 2002). Freedom Watch argues that we should interpret this local statute more broadly to make it consistent with the Americans with Disabilities Act. That Act also contains a provision concerning places of “public accommodation,” and several federal courts have concluded that clause sweeps wider than just physical places. See, e.g., Carparts Distribution Ctr. v. Auto. Wholesaler’s Ass’n, 37 F.3d 12, 19 (1st Cir. 1994). But as the district court noted, other federal courts have reached the opposite conclusion and held that only physical places qualify as places of public accommodation under the ADA. See Freedom Watch, 368 F.Supp.3d at 39. Moreover, the D.C. Court of Appeals is the arbiter of D.C. law and the definitions of “public accommodation” in the two laws are different from one another. The fact that other courts interpret another (though similar) statute differently is not a sufficient reason to deviate from Jaycees.