Judgment Approved by the court for handing down. Miranda v SSHD the PCS taken on its own might not merit the court’s full confidence as a reliable indicator of the purpose of the exercise. The PCS is, with good cause, the tip of what may be a very large iceberg. It may give – in the worst case deliberately, in the best case unwittingly – a false or at least a distorted picture of the true reasons for the stop. It is important that the court should have some evidence of the hierarchy of decision-making behind and above the PCS; and there may be cases where there is no PCS.” 27. At para 26, he said: “Given these successive levels of authorisation, the purpose of the stop may in my judgment confidently be gleaned from the final PCS considered in light of the National Security Justification. DI Woodford acted directly on the former, and D/Supt Stokley’s acquiescence was reinforced by the latter”. 28. At para 27, he summarised the position in these terms: “The purpose of the stop thus disclosed may be simply expressed. It was to ascertain the nature of the material which the claimant was carrying and if on examination it proved to be as was feared, to neutralise the effects of its release (or further release) or dissemination.” 29. During the course of his oral submissions, far from challenging the finding summarised at para 27, it seemed to me that Mr Ryder embraced it. He used it as a springboard for his argument that the purpose found by Laws LJ was an improper purpose because (i) it was not for the purpose of determining whether Mr Miranda appeared to be concerned with CPI, but the national security purpose expressed by the Security Service in the NSJ and (ii) in any event, even if the stop was for the purpose stated in the final PCS, the acts described in that document (the release of the material that Mr Miranda was carrying) could not amount to “terrorism” within the meaning of section 1 of TACT. 30. In my view, the true and dominant purpose for which the stop was executed on the facts of this case emerges clearly from the considerable evidence that has been placed before the court. Importantly, although the process which led to the exercise of the stop power was initiated by the Security Service, the police were involved at an early stage. It is clear from the evidence of Det Supt Stokley that the police exercised their own judgment in deciding whether it was appropriate to conduct the stop. They recognised that they could not act as a conduit for the furtherance of the purposes of the Security Service. They had to be persuaded that the conditions for a lawful exercise of the stop power were satisfied in the circumstances of the case. That is why they rejected the second PCS, which was the first PCS that they considered. DI Woodford has explained why they were persuaded that the final PCS gave them proper authority to proceed under Schedule 7: see para 18 above. 31. I would hold that the true and dominant purpose of the stop was to give effect to the final PCS. On its face, the final PCS was a sufficient basis for authorising an