Judgment Approved by the court for handing down. R (Bridges) -v- CC South Wales & ors requirements of EU law: see e.g. [117], which cited the specific terms of Directive 2002/58, which expressly refers to a measure having to “be subject to adequate safeguards”. Thirdly, that case concerned covert surveillance. It is common ground that the present case, in contrast, is concerned with overt surveillance. 65. Nor do we accept the Appellant’s suggested analogy with the retention of fingerprints or DNA samples, which was considered by the European Court of Human Rights in S v United Kingdom (2009) 48 EHRR 50. Although that case is often cited (and was cited before us) in relation to the requirement that interference with Article 8 rights must be in accordance with the law, it should be noted that the European Court of Human Rights in fact declined to answer that question: see [95]-[99] of the judgment. This was because it considered that the questions raised in that context were closely related to the broader issue of whether the interference was necessary in a democratic society and, in view of its analysis of that issue at [105]-[126], it was not necessary to decide whether the wording of section 64 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 was compatible with the “quality of law” requirements of Article 8(2). 66. When one turns to the Court’s assessment of the proportionality issue in that case, it is clear, in our view, that its reasoning was heavily influenced by the particular sort of interference which was in issue. That case concerned the retention of fingerprints and DNA records. Furthermore, the legislation in issue permitted that retention even in the case of people such as the applicants who, having been arrested, had been acquitted and perhaps never even charged with an offence. The legislation permitted the blanket and indiscriminate retention of such personal data. There were no time limits and no restriction by reference to the type of offence. We consider, like the Divisional Court, that the context of that case is far removed from that of the present case. 67. On behalf of the Appellant Mr Squires also placed reliance on the judgment of Lord Reed JSC in R (T) v Chief Constable of Greater Manchester and Others [2014] UKSC 35, [2015] AC 49, at [114], where he said: “… in order for the interference to be ‘in accordance with the law’, there must be safeguards which have the effect of enabling the proportionality of the interference to be adequately examined. Whether the interference in a given case was in fact proportionate is a separate question.” 68. A similar point was made again by Lord Reed in Christian Institute v Lord Advocate [2016] UKSC 51; [2017] SC (UKSC) 29, at [80], where he cited his earlier judgment in T. 69. The short answer, in our view, to this submission is that the legal framework which regulates the deployment of AFR Locate does contain safeguards which enable the proportionality of the interference with Article 8 rights to be adequately examined. In particular, the regime under the DPA 2018 enables examination of the question whether there was a proper law enforcement purpose and whether the means used were strictly necessary. 70. Mr Squires also submitted, in reliance on Christian Institute, that it was not sufficient that it is possible for a court or tribunal to assess the question of proportionality after