they were precluded from filing and serving any evidence. The defendants did not so file and serve, but, on 13 February 1999, filed and served an affidavit by Mr Clark, a solicitor who had taken over conduct of the matter for the defendants in mid-January 1999. On 19 February 1999, the defendants issued a summons seeking leave to serve and file that affidavit. The Appeals The matter was heard by the Master on 22 February 1999. He dismissed both the summons of 7 July 1998 and the summons of 19 February 1998. The defendants now appeal against both those decisions. Following the lodging of the appeal, the plaintiffs filed and served further evidence. The purpose of this further evidence is to show that the plaintiffs have a substantial connection with Hong Kong and that they suffered damage by the publications in Hong Kong. After this evidence was filed, Mr Clark filed another affidavit on behalf of the defendants. Much of this evidence from Mr Clark is a repetition of the evidence in his first affidavit. The First Appeal The appeal against the Master’s decision on the summons of 19 February 1999 is relatively straightforward. There was nothing before the Master seeking to explain why the “unless” order had not been obeyed. And the delay in filing the evidence in reply was not a few days, or a week or so, but was filed approaching two months after the time limit had expired. There is also no material before me on which some argument could be based that would seek to excuse the delay. What Mr Clark says explains why he gathered the evidence that the defendants sought to adduce, but it goes nowhere towards explaining why the evidence was not gathered and adduced within the time set by the “unless” order. The defendants’ application called for the exercise of a discretion. The exercise of a discretion is not a decision on a whim. There must be some reason advanced for the delay that would enable a judge to understand it and excuse it. It seems to me that, in the circumstances of this case, without some basis on which a discretion could be exercised in favour of the defendants, the applica- 3