dramatically enlarging the time (and cost) required to secure a record’s release in public safety cases.”22 ACLU reminds this Court that this appeal began over six years ago, and ACLU objects to the prospect that, in returning to OOR for further fact-finding, it would be sent back all the way to “Square One.”23 ACLU further cautions that affording PSP a twobites-at-the-apple rule would encourage agencies like PSP to rely upon affidavits that are as vague as possible—knowing that they would get another opportunity to buttress their arguments—and to intentionally protract litigation so that requesters are forced to abandon their pursuits. ACLU relies upon Department of Public Welfare v. Eiseman, in which this Court refused to allow a Commonwealth agency—which had agreed that the only remaining question was whether an exception applied—to introduce new evidence in support of a new defense to disclosure. 24 We held that allowing the Department of Public Welfare to “advance shifting positions” would frustrate the RTKL’s goals of timely disclosure. 25 ACLU argues that the same is true here. Moreover, ACLU contends that Carey v. Pennsylvania Department of Corrections—a case upon which PSP relies—does not compel a different conclusion. 26 There, the Commonwealth Court permitted supplementation of the record based upon the Department of Corrections’ failure to identify which records were responsive to the request and its failure to address whether redactions were appropriate. 27 To the extent that Carey stands for the proposition that Id. at 17 (discussing Bowling v. OOR, 75 A.3d 453, 473 (Pa. 2013) (“Bowling II”) (noting the General Assembly’s “goal . . . of ensuring swift determinations”)). 22 23 Id. at 18. 24 125 A.3d 19, 29 (Pa. 2015) 25 Id. 26 See ACLU Br. at 21-22. 27 61 A.3d at 377. [J-3-2023] - 6