Philippines: Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012 well  clear  of  the  potential  zone  of  application  to  avoid  censure.  As  the  Human  Rights   Committee  has  stated:     For   the   purposes   of   paragraph   3,   a   norm,   to   be   characterized   as   a   “law”,   must   be   formulated   with   sufficient   precision   to   enable   an   individual   to   regulate   his   or   her   conduct   accordingly   and   it   must   be   made   accessible   to   the   public.   A   law   may   not   confer   unfettered   discretion   for   the   restriction   of   freedom   of   expression   on   those   charged   with   its   execution.   Laws   must   provide   sufficient   guidance   to   those   charged   with  their  execution  to  enable  them  to  ascertain  what  sorts  of  expression  are  properly   restricted  and  what  sorts  are  not.8     Second,  the  restriction  must  pursue  one  of  the  legitimate  aims  listed  in  Article  19(3).   It   is   quite   clear   from   both   the   wording   of   the   article   and   the   views   of   the   UN   Human   Rights  Committee  that  this  list  is  exclusive  and  that  restrictions  which  do  not  serve   one  of  the  legitimate  aims  listed  are  not  valid:     Restrictions   are   not   allowed   on   grounds   not   specified   in   paragraph   3,   even   if   such   grounds   would   justify   restrictions   to   other   rights   protected   in   the   Covenant.   Restrictions  must  be  applied  only  for  those  purposes  for  which  they  were  prescribed   and   must   be   directly   related   to   the   specific   need   on   which   they   are   predicated.   [references  omitted]9     It   is   not   sufficient,   to   satisfy   this   part   of   the   test,   for   restrictions   on   freedom   of   expression   to   have   a   merely   incidental   effect   on   one   of   the   legitimate   aims   listed.   The  measure  in  question  must  be  primarily  directed  at  that  aim.10     Third,   the   restriction   must   be   necessary   to   secure   the   aim.   The   necessity   element   of   the  test  presents  a  high  standard  to  be  overcome  by  the  State  seeking  to  justify  the   interference,   apparent   from   the   following   quotation,   cited   repeatedly   by   the   European  Court:     Freedom  of  expression,  as  enshrined  in  Article  10,  is  subject  to  a  number  of  exceptions   which,  however,  must  be  narrowly  interpreted  and  the  necessity  for  any  restrictions   must  be  convincingly  established.11     Courts  have  identified  three  aspects  of  this  part  of  the  test.  First,  restrictions  must   be   rationally   connected   to   the   objective   they   seek   to   promote,   in   the   sense   that   they   are   carefully   designed   to   achieve   that   objective   and   that   they   are   not   arbitrary   or   unfair.  Second,  restrictions  must  impair  the  right  as  little  as  possible  (breach  of  this   condition   is   sometimes   referred   to   as   ‘overbreadth’).   Third,   restrictions   must   be   8  General  Comment  No.  34,  ibid.,  para.  25.   9  Ibid.,  para.  22.  See  also  Mukong  v.  Cameroon,  note  7,  para.9.7.   10  As  the  Indian  Supreme  Court  has  noted:  “So  long  as  the  possibility  [of  a  restriction]  being  applied   for  purposes  not  sanctioned  by  the  Constitution  cannot  be  ruled  out,  it  must  be  held  to  be  wholly   unconstitutional  and  void.”  Thappar  v.  State  of  Madras,  [1950]  SCR  594,  p.  603.   11  See,  for  example,  Thorgeir  Thorgeirson  v.  Iceland,  25  June  1992,  Application  no.  13778/88,  para.  63.   The Centre for Law and Democracy is a non-profit human rights organisation working internationally to provide legal expertise on foundational rights for democracy -3-