Civil Appeal Nos.977 & 978 of 2018 and C.M.A. No.3658/2019 in C.A. No.978/2018 8 there was a legitimate need to suspend cellular services. These protective measures are taken on the request of law enforcement authorities in view of past experience of terrorist activities at similar events. If such events caused the issuance of the impugned directions then the same would be in the public interest, reasonable, fair, consistent with the object of the law and therefore valid. Accordingly, the exercise of power by PTA under the policy directive dated 26.12.2009 ought to be evaluated in the light of the threat that is anticipated. 8. To our minds, the power of PTA under the policy directive dated 26.12.2009 does not conflict with Section 54(3) of the Act which operates in a different field. In fact, it is regulated by Section 8(2)(c) of the Act read with Section 24-A(1) of the 1897 Act and the law laid down by this Court controlling the exercise of delegated authority. Apart from the aforesaid parameters, it is not within the province of a Superior Court to strike down or interfere with decisions taken by Federal Government bodies pursuant to the policy directive dated 26.12.2009. 9. Accordingly, for the reason that the impugned judgment has failed to examine the impugned suspensory directions dated 28.03.2016 in the context of the power conferred on PTA, we consider that the impugned judgment has arrived at a hasty and incorrect conclusion. The learned High Court has construed Section 8(2)(c) to be subservient to Section 54(3) of the Act. In reaching this decision, the learned High Court has misread the Act, specifically the provisions of Section 54, all of which serve an express purpose/function. Whilst these purposes/functions may incidentally be effectuated by the exercise of power under Section 8(2)(c) of the Act but this does not lead to the conclusion