119 In July 2009, the plaintiff, in the proceedings, became aware that a search of her name through Google resulted in the display of extracts, being defamatory material. As a consequence, the plaintiff notified Google of the defamatory material and requested Google to remove the material (or at least ensure that a search through its search mechanisms did not locate the material). 120 The Court, in its reasons for judgment, discussed the principles that should apply in the circumstances that were before it and some of the fundamental first principles upon which it relied to reach that conclusion. By majority, the Full Court dismissed the appeal, from the judgment at first instance, which had held that Google was liable for the defamation associated with the extracts (or summaries) of the primary website and subsequent websites that it published in producing the search results. 121 While not relevant for present purposes, it should be noted that the websites to which Google gave a link when Dr Duffy’s name was searched were defamatory. The Court, both at first instance and on appeal, also found (or confirmed) that the result of the search, itself, being the few lines that were said to summarise the websites obtained by the search, were themselves, in part, defamatory. 122 In the course of his dissenting judgment, Chief Justice Kourakis said at [89]: “The participants in the publication may play primary or secondary roles. Authors and editors are primary participants. The principal of an enterprise which creates or procures and then disseminates words or images is a primary participant in the process of publication and is commonly referred to as the publisher. Historically printers have also been regarded as primary publishers but that rule has been doubted in modern times. Both publishers and printers are generally liable as primary participants even though they print and publish the work through their servants and agents.” 123 And continued, in relation to that aspect, in the following way: “In the broader sense, any facilitation of publication might be said to be participation in it. However, there must be closer limits on the scope of liability as a secondary participant. To draw an analogy with accessorial liability in crime, it is notable that some participation may result in liability as an accessory before the fact but not as a principal in either the first or second degree. So too in the tort of defamation not all facilitation will result in liability, even as a secondary participant, in the publication. Much depends on the degree of causal connection between the facilitating act and the publication of the material.” (Duffy, at [91])