Judgment Approved by the court for handing down. Miranda v SSHD 9. Det Supt Stokley wanted to initiate further inquiries to see whether Mr Miranda or others had committed any criminal offences (including terrorist offences). He had a meeting with the Ports Team SO 15 officers who were responsible for Schedule 7 stops. They agreed that the best way to achieve the objectives of both the Security Service and SO 15 would be to conduct a port stop in this case. Det Supt Stokley then addressed his mind as to how SO 15 “could articulate the justification for the Schedule 7 stop in a way that was consistent with but also independent of the overall joint operational objectives of the operation which had been set by the Security Service” (para 20 of his first witness statement). It was decided that two levels of authorisation were required. The first was a request from the Security Service asking SO 15 to consider using police powers under Schedule 7 to conduct a port stop. The second concerned the tactical aspects of the proposed stop which had to be agreed between the examining officers and the Security Service. 10. The first stage of the authorisation process was contained in the Security Service’s National Security Justification (“the NSJ”), a document emanating from the Security Service. The second stage was reflected in a Port Circulation Sheet (“PCS”) which was completed by the Security Service following dialogue between the Security Service and the Ports Officers. A PCS is a form of document used by inter alia the Security Service to provide information to counter-terrorism police officers. Det Supt Stokley said that it was only when both stages in the authorisation process had been completed and the documents received that a port stop could take place. He saw his focus as being to seek to determine whether Mr Miranda appeared to be a person who was or had been concerned in the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism (para 24 of his first statement). The acts of terrorism that he had in mind when considering the justification for a Schedule 7 stop “were acts which endangered life, created a serious risk to the safety of the public or were designed to seriously disrupt an electronic system” (para 26). 11. Some time on Friday 16 August 2013, Det Supt Stokley received the NSJ that his commanding officer had requested from the Security Service. The redacted text included the following: “2... We strongly assess that MIRANDA is carrying items which will assist in GREENWALD releasing more of the NSA and GCHQ material we judge to be in GREENWALD’s possession. Open source research details the relationship between POITRAS, GREENWALD and SNOWDEN which corroborates our assessment as to the likelihood that GREENWALD has access to the protectively marked material SNOWDEN possesses. Our main objectives against David MIRANDA are to understand the nature of any material he is carrying, mitigate the risks to national security that this material poses... 3. We are requesting that you exercise your powers to carry out a ports stop against David MIRANDA... 4. We judge that a ports stop of David MIRANDA is the only way of mitigating the risks posed by David MIRANDA to UK national security... Additionally there is a substantial risk that David MIRANDA holds material which would be severely damaging to UK national security interests. SNOWDEN holds a large volume of GCHQ material which, if released, would have serious consequences for GCHQ’s collection capabilities, as well as broader SIA operational activities, going forwards...”