Cite as: 575 U. S. ____ (2015) 5 Opinion of ALITO, J. variety of contexts, we have described reckless conduct as morally culpable. See, e.g., Farmer, supra, at 835–836 (deliberate indifference to an inmate’s harm); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 64, 75 (1964) (criminal libel); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254, 279–280 (1964) (civil libel). Indeed, this Court has held that “reckless disregard for human life” may justify the death penalty. Tison v. Arizona, 481 U. S. 137, 157 (1987). Someone who acts recklessly with respect to conveying a threat necessarily grasps that he is not engaged in innocent conduct. He is not merely careless. He is aware that others could regard his statements as a threat, but he delivers them anyway. Accordingly, I would hold that a defendant may be convicted under §875(c) if he or she consciously disregards the risk that the communication transmitted will be interpreted as a true threat. Nothing in the Court’s noncommittal opinion prevents lower courts from adopting that standard. II There remains the question whether interpreting §875(c) to require no more than recklessness with respect to the element at issue here would violate the First Amendment. Elonis contends that it would. I would reject that argument. It is settled that the Constitution does not protect true threats. See Virginia v. Black, 538 U. S. 343, 359–360 (2003); R. A. V. v. St. Paul, 505 U. S. 377, 388 (1992); Watts, 394 U. S., at 707–708. And there are good reasons for that rule: True threats inflict great harm and have little if any social value. A threat may cause serious emotional stress for the person threatened and those who care about that person, and a threat may lead to a violent confrontation. It is true that a communication containing a threat may include other statements that have value