HURBAIN v. BELGIUM JUDGMENT as interpreted by the Belgian legal literature and case-law, constituted legislation that was sufficiently accessible, clear, precise and foreseeable for the purposes of Article 10 § 2 of the Convention. 27. The Court of Appeal went on to dismiss the applicant’s argument that G.’s action had been brought against him erroneously since it should have been directed against the search engine operators. The court found as follows: “The indexing of the impugned article by search engines is only possible because the article is present in the database of Le Soir in non-anonymised form and without any noindex tag. As observed above, [G.] is entitled to bring his action against the news publisher with a view to having the article concerning him anonymised, resulting in the removal of the results obtained following a search based on his first name and surname.” 28. Regarding the “right to be forgotten”, which, in the applicant’s submission, was not applicable in the case at issue, the Court of Appeal stressed as follows: “Alongside the traditional aspect of the right to be forgotten linked to the fresh disclosure by the press of a person’s previous convictions, there exists a second aspect linked to the erasure of the digital data, and in particular the data available on the Internet. The present dispute, which concerns the digitisation of journalistic archives, raises issues in relation to the latter aspect, namely the right to be forgotten online. That right concerns the possibility for an individual to request the erasure of data concerning him or her, and more specifically data posted online, after a given period. The aim, therefore, is no longer to prevent or punish the disclosure of past events, but to obtain the removal of information available on the Internet ... This right to be forgotten online was recognised very recently by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU (Grand Chamber), 13 May 2014, Case C-131/12). In that judgment the CJEU held that the requirement regarding fresh disclosure of the information could be inferred from the effect of the search tool, which gave prominence to information that would not otherwise be visible online ... It is true that the CJEU judgment concerned a dispute between a Spanish citizen and the operator of a search engine (Google). Nevertheless, the principles established by that judgment can be transposed to the case at hand in so far as the publisher has also enabled the article in question to be given prominence via the search engine of the newspaper’s website, which is accessible free of charge. The effect is also multiplied significantly by the development of the ‘crawling’ software used by Google-type search engines ... The right to be forgotten online, like the traditional right to be forgotten, is not unlimited and has to be tightly regulated in so far as it is liable to come into conflict with the freedom of expression of the press. The case-law, and in particular that of the Court of Justice of the European Union, has defined a number of criteria and conditions designed to guide the courts in assessing whether a proper balance had been struck between the fundamental rights enshrined, inter alia, in Articles 8 and 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (see, in particular, [ECHR], 7 February 2012, Von Hannover v. Germany, and CJEU (GC), 13 May 2014, Google v. Mario Costeja González; see also Namur Court of First 9

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