Cite as: 595 U. S. ____ (2022) 7 Opinion of the Court by the dismissal remedy sometimes required by the common law state secrets privilege.” Id., at 1045. That is so, the Court of Appeals reasoned, because §1806(f )’s procedures are “animated by the same concerns” as the state secrets privilege and “triggered” by a “nearly identical" process. Id., at 1046. It thus reversed the District Court’s dismissal of respondents’ claims on state secrets grounds. The Ninth Circuit denied rehearing en banc over the dissent of Judge Bumatay and nine other judges. We granted certiorari to decide whether §1806(f ) displaces the state secrets privilege. 594 U. S. ___ (2021). II A Much of the parties’ argumentation in this Court concerns the correct interpretation of §1806(f ). The Government contends that the Ninth Circuit erred because §1806(f ) is “ ‘relevant only when a litigant challenges the admissibility of the government’s surveillance evidence.’ ” Reply Brief for Petitioners 2 (quoting Wikimedia Foundation v. NSA, 14 F. 4th 276, 294 (CA4 2021)). But respondents interpret that provision more broadly. Respondents do not dispute that §1806(f ) applies when the Government seeks to introduce evidence and a private party seeks to prevent such use, but they argue that §1806(f ) is also sometimes triggered when “a civil litigant seeks to obtain such secret information.” Brief for Respondents 34. And they say that §1806(f ) applies in this case for two reasons. First, they note that §1806(f ) is triggered not only when the Government gives notice that it intends to “enter into evidence” information obtained by means of covered surveillance but also when it notifies the court that it “intends to . . . otherwise use” such information. §1806(c). Respondents argue that the Government “use[d]” information gathered under FISA when it invoked the state secrets privilege and asked the District Court to dismiss some