and Manipulation Act of 2019 (POFMA), and Online Criminal Harms Act (OCHA) of 2023. The OCHA’s inclusion of offences relating to “harmony between different races, religions, or classes of the population” impacting freedom of expression negatively has been consistent since enactment. The POFMA enables any Government Minister to order correction notices and to restrict or remove access to content if they are of the opinion that it contains false statements. It is important to note that several provisions of Sri Lanka’s Online Safety Act No. 09 of 2024 (OSA) appear to be inspired by POFMA. 02. POLITICS, CULTURE, & THE LAW Attempts by the State to regulate online expression have gained pace since the early 2010s. (Davies, 2015) Sri Lanka’s use of the digital sphere has evolved into a tour de force of mobilisation, galvanising collective dissent of the 2022 Aragalaya (trans. struggle) protests resulting in the resignation of a sitting President. The use of social media hashtags and livestreams to raise awareness attracted thousands to join the protests that played a key role in changing Sri Lanka’s political landscape. During the Aragalaya, activists, journalists and members of civil society were arbitrarily arrested and called in for questioning at the Criminal Investigation Department (CID), amongst other intimidation tactics in the Government’s broader attempt to stifle dissent. In April 2022, following a violent crackdown on protests, then-President Gotabaya Rajapaksa declared an emergency curfew and issued a block on social media platforms (Deutsche Welle, 2022). This would not be the first attempt by the Sri Lankan State to have blocked social media platforms. The 2018 anti-Muslim riots in Digana, for example, were catalysed on Facebook and YouTube by Amith Weerasinghe, leader of Sinhala Buddhist extremist group Mahason Balakaya. The group and others like it had been spreading Islamophobic rhetoric on social media for years before, culminating in calling upon people to engage in the “long-overdue act of addressing the issue by thronging Digana town”(Senaratne, 2021). In a matter of hours, Sinhalese Buddhist mobs had descended upon Digana and destroyed homes, businesses and other property of many Muslim families in the area. The Government blocked social media to prevent further escalation of violence. What we are seeing in the years since Digana and then Aragalaya is a regulatory model premised on criminalisation. This model is situated within an enforcement mechanism with a history of abuse, and mismanagement, and one with little to no public faith. With Internet users increasingly turning towards online expression, be it to express dissent against Governments or to simply have an online presence, the State has consistently tried to intervene and curtail expression. - 05 -