由此 -8- A B C D E 19. The 1st applicant (but not the 2nd applicant), has appealed against the judge’s decision in this regard. 20. The 1st applicant relies principally on the submissions made by Mr Dykes SC to the judge, which were dealt with in paras. 47 to 98 of the A B C D E judgment. On the basis of the leading authority on the subject, namely, the F G decision of the House of Lords in R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Fire Brigades Union & Ors [1995] 2 AC 513, the F G judge concluded that section 1(2) of IOC Ordinance did not: H H “… impose a legally enforceable duty on the Secretary of State to bring the enacted provisions into force at any particular time…” (Para. 53 of the judgment) I J 21. K The relevant wording of the provision under consideration in Fire Brigades Union was: “… that provisions of the 1988 Act ‘shall come into force on such day as the Secretary of State may … appoint.’” (See para. 54 of the judgment) L M 22. K L We agree with the judge that although the wording of section 1(2) of IOC Ordinance is different, the meaning and intent is the same. P J M N O I We also agree that, section 1(2) did not impose a duty on the Chief N O Executive to bring the IOC Ordinance into force at any particular time, P although it did impose a continuing obligation on the Chief Executive to Q consider whether to bring it into force. R R 23. We also agree with the judge that: S T Q “72. In respect of the present case, therefore, the Chief Executive, while not bound by any finite timetable, has at all times remained S T U U V V