904-NMS-1220-15-F4.DOC doubt by strong-arming seems to me a decidedly odd way of going about restoring that public faith. It is not a move that, from a public institution, readily commends itself. For public bodies and figures, I would suggest that the legal standard is set higher to demonstrated actual malice and a wanton and reckless embracing of falsehood though countered at the first available opportunity. I do not think it is reasonable to propose a legal standard of utter faultlessness in reportage or public comment in relation to such bodies or persons. If there is indeed a factual error, can it be said to have been made in good faith, and in a reasonable belief that it was true? The ‘actual malice’ standard seems to me to suggest that one or both of these must be shown: intentional falsehood, or a reckless failure to attempt the verification that a reasonable person would. In this case, I do not think that the Plaintiffs have met that standard, or demonstrated either intentional falsehood or a failure to attempt a verification. The burden of proof in claiming the qualified privilege that attaches to fair comment can safely be said to have been discharged. 27. As a result, there is no prima facie case made here at all, nor is there any question of balance of convenience or any sort of prejudice being caused to the Plaintiffs if the injunction sought is declined. I will not grant the injunction sought. The Notice of Motion is dismissed. The previous ad-interim order is vacated. 28. There remains the question of costs. Looking to the material that has been published, and the manner in which this action has been brought, I have very little doubt in my mind that this is a matter that cries out for the award of costs. Not only is this 28 of 30 ::: Uploaded on - 10/09/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 03/02/2020 18:08:37 :::