of review. This particularly applies to matters that are fully harmonised under EU law. Given that German fundamental rights are generally not applicable in such constellations, fundamental rights protection can only be guaranteed if the Federal Constitutional Court applies EU fundamental rights as its standard when reviewing the application of the law by the ordinary courts. If it were to withdraw from fundamental rights protection in such constellations, it would be able to fulfil this role less and less, given that EU law governs ever more areas of life. Therefore, complete fundamental rights protection requires that EU fundamental rights be taken into account where, in exceptional cases, the level of protection of the Charter in matters that are not fully harmonised sets out requirements that are not covered by the fundamental rights of the Basic Law (cf. BVerfG, Order of the First Senate also issued today - 1 BvR 16/ 13 -, para. 67 et seq.). Legal recourse under EU law is not sufficient to fill the gap in protection arising from the application of EU fundamental rights by the ordinary courts. This is because individuals have no direct recourse to the Court of Justice of the European Union for asserting a violation of EU fundamental rights in such cases. 61 (4) The extension of Federal Constitutional Court review to EU fundamental rights is not rendered unnecessary by the fact that, in applying EU law, the ordinary courts have already provided the protection required by EU fundamental rights. The Federal Constitutional Court can only effectively fulfil its responsibilities under the Basic Law if it can review ordinary court decisions specifically as to their respect of fundamental rights. 62 (a) The constitutional complaint, which allows for independent review by the Federal Constitutional Court, is an instrument deliberately created to complement legal protection by the ordinary courts. It opens up the additional nationwide possibility of reviewing ordinary court decisions from a specialised fundamental rights perspective so as to safeguard the special weight accorded to fundamental rights vis-à-vis ordinary law and afford citizens protection in this regard. Today, EU law partially takes precedence over fundamental rights protection under constitutional law, yet there is no reason why citizens should not be able to lodge a constitutional complaint regardless. On the contrary, it follows from the participation of the Federal Republic of Germany and of the Federal Constitutional Court in the development of the EU provided for in Art. 23(1) first sentence GG that this legal remedy is extended to the enforcement of EU fundamental rights. Otherwise, there would be no possibility, other than the possibility afforded in Art. 267 TFEU, to review whether the application of the law by the ordinary courts is compatible with fundamental rights. 63 (b) Given that the constitutional complaint guarantees a comprehensive fundamental rights review, including whether fundamental rights were applied correctly in the individual case, it is not sufficient to merely review whether the ordinary courts, in light of the right to one’s lawful judge (Art. 101(1) second sentence GG; cf. BVerfGE 147, 364 <378 and 379 para. 37> with further references; BVerfGE 149, 222 64 13/36