Walt & Co Ltd, 1976 (1) SA 530 (T) at pp 534 A to 535 H; Hudson & Knight (Pty) Ltd v D H Brothers Industries (Pty) Ltd T/A Willowtown Oil and Cake Mills and Another, 1979 (4) SA 221 (N), at p 224 F; Juvena Produits de Beaute SA v BLP Import and Export, 38. 1980 (3) SA 210 (T), at p 218 B-G; and see Chowles and Webster, op. cit. pp 200-01). As explained by Chowles and Webster (at the pages cited) this means that in making the necessary comparison the court is not confined to the manner in which the parties have actually used their respective marks: it may have regard to how they can use the marks in a fair and normal manner. Respondent's counsel contended that while the notional user test might be appropriate in cases of the opposed registration of a mark, it was not correct to apply it in an infringement case. I can well see that in considering the question of infringement the court should have regard not only 39. to the plaintiff's actual use of his registered mark, but also to notional use, that is to all possible fair and normal applications of the mark within the ambit of the monopoly created by the terms of the registration (cf remarks of BOTHA J in the adidas case, supra, at p 535 B-D). I have some difficulty, however, in applying the notional user approach to the use by the defendant of his mark, especially as regards the type of goods to which the mark is applied. If the actual proven user by the defendant falls outside the ambit of the plaintiff's monopoly, then I fail to see how it can be said to infringe merely on the ground that a notional fair and normal user of his mark - which 40. had not in fact occurred - would trespass upon the plaintiff's monopoly. To take a pertinent example: suppose respondent in this case had used a mark which was deceptively similar to plaintiff's mark in relation to an insulating varnish (an item specifically excluded from the goods in respect of which appellant's mark was