a tin of Mikacote could well, in my opinion, be deceived into thinking that this was the product he was seeking; and it is likely that this could occur on a substantial scale. Moreover, I think that a substantial number of such persons, knowing that the product they were seeking was a "texture coating"; would be likely to be confused between "Micatex", the suffix being the first syllable of "texture", and "Mikacote", where the suffix is a phonetic transcription of the first syllable of "coating". At the very least, .1 consider that the resemblance between the marks is sufficient to cause a substantial number of such customers to be confused as to whether or not there was a material connection between respondent's goods, 47 bearing the mark Mikacote, and the proprietor of the Micatex mark. The Court a quo, which decided the infringement issue adversely to appellant, appears to have based its decision mainly on a verbal comparison of the two marks and upon the conclusion (thereby differing from the Judge of first instance) that in practice the two marks would not be used in conjunction with the generic description "texture coating". I am inclined to agree with this latter conclusion, but in my view, a purely verbal comparison is not enough. As I have said, in cases such as this the Court must transport itself to the market place and try to visualize how 48 customers of the goods, in relation to which the marks are used, would react. The case is not an easy one. This is shown by the division of judicial opinion which has occurred in this case and in the parallel case in the Orange Free State Provincial Division (see Decro Paint and Hardware (Pty) Ltd v Plascon-Evans Paints (Tvl) Ltd, 1982 (4) SA 213 (0) ), the matter which came before us on appeal immediately after the present one. Having carefully considered the matter, however, I am of the view, for the reasons stated,