mica and that it was a texture coating would not use the spellings "Mika" and "cote". Clearly the respondent used the word as his trade name for the paint contained in the tin and not as a fair description of the character or quality of the paint. Moreover, all the circumstances emphasized above, indicate the probability that the name was devised so as to resemble appellant's trade mark Micatex; and that respondent used the name not for purposes of description, but with the ulterior object of deceiving or confusing and of making use of the goodwill attaching to the Micatex mark. Accordingly,I am satisfied that respondent's use of its mark Mikacote did not constitute the use 61 of a bona fide description of the character or quality of its goods, within the terms of s. 46 (b) of the Act. During the course of his argument respondent's counsel argued strenuously that appellant could not claim a monopoly in the word or prefix "mica", a well-known mineral substance often used as an ingredient of paint; that appellant was not entitled to describe its product, by means of a trade mark, which included the word "mica", a non-distinctive word; and so on. He referred in this connection to cases such as Corn Products Refining Co v African Products Manufacturing Co., 1922 WLD 163 and Aktiebolaget Hjorth and Co. v Aktiebolaget 62 Optimus, 1932 TPD 177. In so far as counsel's argument is aimed at the validity of the original registration of appellant's trade mark, it is off target because the trade mark has been registered in part A of the register for more than seven years (see s. 42 of the Act) and neither of the requisites posed by subsections (a) or (b) of s. 42 is present; and in so far as the argument is really directed at the defence provided by s. 46 (b), it has already been dealt with.