rather requires the Court’s intervention in remedying the absence of a necessary provision which protects constitutional rights. Additionally, because the President’s current referral of the CAB raises constitutional questions about the Bill’s provisions which have not yet been enacted into law, the Court has to craft an appropriate interim remedy that addresses the lapsed suspension period while the legislative process takes its course. The Court therefore compared section 13A against clause 19D with their ancillary provisions. After considering the submissions, the Court decided to read in clause 19D instead of section 13A, concluding that it constitutes a just and equitable remedy. This was on the basis that the provision had undergone substantial revision, was not one of the provisions in the President’s referral, a proper parliamentary process had been followed for its incorporation into the Bill, its reading-in respects legislative prerogatives, and it has developed into a broader provision which encompasses multiple formats and artistic works, reflective of both procedural improvements and substantive enhancement of its legal architecture. Clause 19D provides a more comprehensive framework aligned with constitutional imperatives and international obligations, specifically those of the Marrakesh Treaty. It balances accessibility requirements with copyright protections through specific attribution requirements and detailed safeguards against misuse – particularly in international transfers. Its substantive improvements render it a more robust and legally sustainable framework, as it harmonises both the evolving disability rights’ principles, and South Africa’s international obligations and provides meaningful relief in a way that section 13A could not accomplish. On costs, the Court held that, as much as the other respondents participated in these proceedings, it was the President alone who had both the knowledge and power to prevent this litigation. His lack of communication led to the expiry of the 7