Case: 12-57302, 05/18/2015, ID: 9540348, DktEntry: 197-1, Page 25 of 42 GARCIA V. GOOGLE 25 seeks to avoid—damage to her reputation, unfair[,] forced promotion of a hateful Film, and death—will be avoided if any injunction issues.” This relief is not easily achieved under copyright law. Although we do not take lightly threats to life or the emotional turmoil Garcia has endured, her harms are untethered from—and incompatible with—copyright and copyright’s function as the engine of expression. In broad terms, “the protection of privacy is not a function of the copyright law. . . . To the contrary, the copyright law offers a limited monopoly to encourage ultimate public access to the creative work of the author.” Bond v. Blum, 317 F.3d 385, 395 (4th Cir. 2003); see also Monge v. Maya Magazines, Inc., 688 F.3d 1164, 1177 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Bond and “pointedly” noting copyright cases are analyzed “only under copyright principles, not privacy law”). Likewise, authors cannot seek emotional distress damages under the Copyright Act, because such damages are unrelated to the value and marketability of their works. See In re Dawson, 390 F.3d 1139, 1146 n.3 (9th Cir. 2004) (noting that “‘actual damages’ in the context of the Copyright Act . . . cover only economic damages” (internal citation omitted)); Mackie v. Rieser, 296 F.3d 909, 917 (9th Cir. 2002) (rejecting copyright damages where “the infringement did not in any way influence the market value” of a piece of outdoor artwork but instead boiled down to the author’s “personal objections to the manipulation of his artwork”). By way of example, erstwhile professional wrestler and reality TV star Hulk Hogan wanted to enjoin Gawker.com from posting a sex tape of Hogan with a mistress, claiming