HURBAIN v. BELGIUM JUDGMENT
newspaper’s digital archives, giving details of the detention of two
individuals for drug trafficking. More than twenty years later, in 2009, after
they had been released and rehabilitated, the individuals in question learnt
that the article featured among the top results of a search based on their names
carried out on the most commonly used search engines. In their statement of
claim they sought (a) the removal or anonymisation of the information in the
archives by El País and (b) the delisting, by the operators of search engines
such as Google and by the newspaper itself, of the links to the article in
question. Although the two lower Spanish courts upheld the applicants’
claims, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal lodged by the newspaper and
dismissed the part of the action concerning the alteration of the web page and
its de-indexing on the newspaper’s internal search engine.
107. The Constitutional Court was thus called upon to weigh up the
various rights at stake, including the “right to be forgotten”, which it defined
as an aspect of the fundamental right to protection against the processing of
personal data. Although that right also operated as a safeguard for the
protection of individuals’ privacy and their honour, to which it was closely
linked, it was nevertheless an autonomous fundamental right. The court also
took the view that the “right to be forgotten” was not absolute and that, as a
general rule, freedom of information took precedence over the right to respect
for private life and the right to informational self-determination, from which
the “right to be forgotten” was derived.
108. The Constitutional Court stated that it would apply its settled
case-law concerning the balancing of the right to respect for private life
against freedom of information – an approach which was consistent with the
Court’s case-law. However, two decisive criteria were to be added to that
balancing exercise, bearing in mind that the protection of personal data was
involved: these were the passage of time and the publication of the
information in question on the Internet. After observing that the information
in question was truthful and was a matter of public interest since it related to
a criminal case, the Constitutional Court deemed it essential to qualify its
previous case-law in some respects. It found as follows:
“As previously stated, the public relevance of the information is determined both by
the subject matter and by the situation of the person to whom it refers. But the interest
in the information may also be linked to its ‘topicality’, that is to say, to the degree to
which it relates directly to the present time. The subject or object of a news report may
be relevant in the abstract, but if it refers to an event which took place many years ago
and which is unconnected to current events, it may have lost some of its public interest
or information value and may or may not have acquired historical, statistical or
scientific interest. Despite their indisputable significance, these types of interest are not
directly linked to the formation of free, informed and pluralist public opinion; rather,
they are linked to the overall development of culture which, of course, underlies the
formation of opinions. In such cases, therefore, this may call into question the
precedence given to the right to information [Article 20 § 1 (d) of the Constitution] over
the right to privacy [Article 18 § 1 of the Constitution] of a person who, after a certain
amount of time has passed, opts to request that those data and that information, which
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