HURBAIN v. BELGIUM JUDGMENT pursued a legitimate aim, namely the protection of the restaurant owner’s reputation, and had been necessary. In arriving at that conclusion it took into consideration the following criteria: the length of time for which the article was kept online, the sensitiveness of the data and the gravity of the sanction imposed. It therefore ruled that there had been no breach of the applicant’s freedom of expression, especially since he had not actually been required to remove the article from the website. 199. Thus, from the standpoint of the Convention, the “right to be forgotten online” has been linked to Article 8, and more specifically to the right to respect for one’s reputation, irrespective of what measures are sought for that purpose (the removal or alteration of a newspaper article in the online archives or the limitation of access to the article through de-indexing by a news outlet). In the Court’s view, a claim of entitlement to be forgotten does not amount to a self-standing right protected by the Convention and, to the extent that it is covered by Article 8, can concern only certain situations and items of information. In any event, the Court has not hitherto upheld any measure removing or altering information published lawfully for journalistic purposes and archived on the website of a news outlet. (iii) The criteria to be applied by the Court 200. The question which the Court must address in the present case is whether the decisions of the Belgian courts ordering the applicant to anonymise the electronic version of the impugned article on the website of the newspaper Le Soir, on grounds of the “right to be forgotten”, amounted to a violation of freedom of expression under Article 10 of the Convention. In that connection it will have to determine whether the anonymisation order was based on relevant and sufficient reasons in the specific circumstances of the present case and, in particular, whether it was proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. 201. Having dealt with numerous applications in which it was called upon to examine the fair balance to be struck between freedom of expression and various aspects of the right to respect for private life in cases concerning initial publication, the Court has developed an extensive body of case-law on the subject, establishing criteria relating to the balancing of these rights and the Contracting States’ margin of appreciation in this context. In Couderc and Hachette Filipacchi Associés (cited above, §§ 90-93), under Article 10 of the Convention, the Court summarised the general principles in this regard as follows: “90. The choice of the means calculated to secure compliance with Article 8 of the Convention in the sphere of the relations of individuals between themselves is in principle a matter that falls within the Contracting States’ margin of appreciation, whether the obligations on the State are positive or negative ... Likewise, under Article 10 of the Convention, the Contracting States have a certain margin of appreciation in assessing whether and to what extent an interference with the freedom 69