HURBAIN v. BELGIUM JUDGMENT either, as the article related to an unexceptional – albeit tragic – short news story which was not alleged, still less demonstrated, to have been a source of particular public concern (see paragraph 29 above). The Court sees no reason to question the duly reasoned assessment of the national court in this regard. (iv) Whether the person claiming entitlement to be forgotten is well known, and his or her conduct since the events 226. As a general rule, the role or function of the person who is the subject of a report and/or photograph constitutes another important criterion to be taken into account in balancing the rights guaranteed by Articles 8 and 10 of the Convention (see Von Hannover (no. 2), cited above, § 110, and Axel Springer AG, cited above, § 91). The extent to which an individual has a public profile or is well known influences the protection that may be afforded to his or her private life. Thus, the Court has accepted on numerous occasions that the public was entitled to be informed about certain aspects of the private life of public figures. This criterion, applicable in the case of newly published material, is also pertinent in the context of digital press archives (see M.L. and W.W. v. Germany, cited above, § 106). 227. The question whether the person concerned is well known should be examined in the light of the circumstances of the case and from the perspective of the time when the “right to be forgotten” request is made. The person’s public profile may predate the facts reported on in the impugned article or be contemporaneous with them. Furthermore, while a person’s public profile may diminish over time, he or she may also return to the limelight at a later stage for a variety of reasons. 228. The person’s conduct since the events that were the subject of the original article may also justify refusing a “right to be forgotten” request in some situations (see M.L. and W.W. v. Germany, cited above, § 108). Conversely, the fact of staying out of the media spotlight may weigh in favour of protecting a person’s reputation. 229. In the instant case the Liège Court of Appeal observed that G. did not hold any public office. In contrast to the argument advanced by the applicant before the Court (see paragraph 143 above), the Court of Appeal took the view that the mere fact that G. was a doctor in no sense justified his continued identification in the online article some twenty years after the events (see paragraph 29 above). For its part, the Court notes that G. was an individual unknown to the general public both at the time of the events and at the time of his request for anonymisation (see, conversely, M.L. and W.W. v. Germany, cited above, § 106). Furthermore, the case did not attract widespread publicity either at the time of the events reported on or when the archived version of the article was placed online. 230. The Court further notes that the domestic courts did not rule expressly on the issue of G.’s conduct after the events. There is also nothing to suggest that G. made contact with the media in order to publicise his 77