BULGAKOV v. RUSSIA JUDGMENT – SEPARATE OPINION JOINT CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGES LEMMENS, DEDOV AND POLÁČKOVÁ 1. We fully concur in the conclusion that Articles 10 and 13 of the Convention have been violated. We would like to add a few thoughts to the reasoning under Article 10. 2. The interference in this case was a court decision ordering a local Internet provider to block access to the applicant’s website “www.razumei.ru”. The court order was delivered at the request of a regional prosecutor who had brought proceedings against the Internet provider (but without involving the applicant in them). The prosecutor’s request and the ensuing court order were based on the fact that the applicant’s website contained a specific item (a specific e-book) that had been previously categorised as “extremist”. The prosecutor had asked the court to block access to the applicant’s website by adding filter rules for the website’s IP address. The court granted the request, including the method to be used for the blocking measure. Following the implementation of the court’s decision by the Internet provider, access was blocked to the entire website, not only to the page containing the e-book. The entire website was thus blocked due to the method chosen to block a specifically targeted webpage on that site. 3. The impugned measure was based on section 10(6) of the Information Act. According to this provision, it is prohibited to disseminate information that is aimed at propaganda for war, or incitement of national, racial or religious hatred or hostility, as well as information the dissemination of which is prohibited on pain of a criminal or administrative sanction. As the Court notes, the applicant did not dispute that the e-book constituted prohibited material. His complaint only concerned the continued blocking of access to the entire website, even after the prohibited material had been removed from it (see paragraph 30 of the judgment). It is clear that the court ordered the Internet provider to use a wholly inadequate method to block access to the e-book on the applicant’s website. We concur in the judgment where it states that “extending the scope of the blocking order far beyond the illegal content which had originally been targeted ... did not have a legal basis in the circumstances of the present case” (see paragraph 34 of the judgment). We also agree, a fortiori, that “there was no legal basis for ... the continued blocking of the website after [the unlawful content (the e-book)] had been removed” (see paragraph 38 of the judgment). In our opinion, the lack of a basis in domestic law in itself suffices to conclude that the interference was not “prescribed by law”. 4. We agree, however, with our esteemed colleagues that there has been additionally a deficiency in the way in which the present case was handled at the domestic level. 15