03/02/2020 Privacy International v Secretary of State for Foreign And Commonwealth Affairs & Ors (Rev 2) [2016] UKIPTrib 15_110-CH (17 October 2016) obtained (albeit that at the point of initial acquisition of the BCD the identity of the individuals will be unknown), both in relation to subjects of intelligence interest and in relation to other individuals who may be of no intelligence interest, against (b) the expected value of the intelligence to be derived from the data. Staff must be satisfied that the level of interference with the individual's right to privacy is justified by the value of the intelligence that is sought to be derived from the data and the importance of the objective to be achieved. Staff must also consider whether there is a reasonable alternative that will still meet the proposed objective - i.e. which involves less intrusion." 36. Once made, a Section 94 Direction must be served on the CNP concerned in order that the relevant Agency can receive the requested dataset (§4.2.1). 37. Safeguards against unauthorised access are set out at §4.2.2: "4.2.2 It is essential that any BCD is acquired in a safe and secure manner and that Intelligence Services safeguard against unauthorised access. Intelligence Services must therefore adhere to the controls outlined in the CESG6 Good Practice Guide for transferring and storage of data electronically or physically." Access/Use 38. The Section 94 Handling Arrangements emphasise the importance of data security and protective security standards, confidentiality of data and preventing/disciplining misuse of such data: "4.3.1 Each Intelligence Service must attach the highest priority to maintaining data security and protective security standards. Moreover, each Intelligence Service must establish handling procedures so as to ensure that the integrity and confidentiality of the information in BCD held is fully protected, and that there are adequate safeguards in place to minimise the risk of any misuse of such data and, in the event that such misuse occurs, to ensure that appropriate disciplinary action is taken." 39. As with BPD, specific, detailed measures are also set out which are designed to limit access to data to what is necessary and proportionate, to ensure that such access is properly audited, and to ensure that disciplinary measures are in place for misuse: "4.3.2 In particular, each Intelligence Service must apply the following protective security measures: •    Physical security to protect any premises where the information may be accessed; •    IT security to minimise the risk of unauthorised access to IT systems; •    A security vetting regime for personnel which is designed to provide assurance that those who have access to this material are reliable and trustworthy. 4.3.3 Furthermore, each Intelligence Service is obliged to put in place the following additional measures: •    Access to BCD must be strictly limited to those with an appropriate business requirement to use these data and managed by a strict authorisation process; •    Requests to access BCD must be justified on the grounds of necessity and proportionality and must demonstrate consideration of collateral intrusion and the use of any other less intrusive means of achieving the desired intelligence dividend. •    Intelligence Service staff who apply to access BCD must have regard to the further guidance on the application of the necessity and proportionality tests set out in paragraph 4.1.3 - 4.1.4 above. •    Where Intelligence Service staff intend to access BCD relating to the communications of an individual known to be a member of a profession that handles privileged information or information that is otherwise confidential (medical doctors, lawyers, journalists, Members of Parliament, Ministers of religion), they must give special consideration to the necessity and proportionality justification for the interference with privacy that will be involved; www.bailii.org/cgi-bin/format.cgi?doc=/uk/cases/UKIPTrib/2016/15_110-CH.html&query=([2016])+AND+(UKIPTrib)+AND+(15_110-CH) 35/53