In spite of its finding that Major Burig’s Affidavit was “insufficient to connect the text of AR 6-9 with the risks he articulates,” the court concluded nonetheless that “PSP should be given a further opportunity to explain the nature and degree of the risks it claims are inherent in potential disclosure of the contents of AR 6-9.” 18 It then vacated OOR’s Final Determination and remanded the matter to OOR for “further supplementation of the record, including an evidentiary hearing, and issuance of a new determination.” 19 ACLU again petitioned this Court for allocatur, which we granted. ACLU first argues that the Commonwealth Court abused its discretion in refusing to order the release of AR 6-9, given that court’s conclusion that the Burig Affidavit did not support PSP’s heavy redactions. A “straightforward reading of the text of the RTKL and a dispassionate application of this Court’s precedents,” ACLU asserts, leaves “nothing left for the Commonwealth Court to do except affirm the OOR’s order.” 20 According to ACLU, the intermediate panel’s decision to remand lacked a basis in the text of the RTKL or any justification on the record, and also conflicted with the statute’s core purposes. ACLU stresses that the General Assembly intended to require proof of “a probable threat to public safety, not a possible or colorable one,” and ACLU maintains that the Commonwealth Court undermined that requirement by exempting PSP from the applicable burden of proof in light of its security concerns. 21 ACLU argues that, while the General Assembly could have carved out a special status for law enforcement agencies, it did not. As a result of “permitting [PSP] to obtain a do-over of its effort[s] to carry its burden of proof,” ACLU contends, the decision below “undercuts expediency by 18 Id. at *5. 19 Id. 20 ACLU Br. at 14. 21 Id. at 15-16 (emphases in original). [J-3-2023] - 5