14.4 There are various reasons why I find it difficult to accept this submission of Mr. Lall. 14.5 In the first place, para 43 of the judgment dated 10 June 2021 of Narula, J. does not restrict the right of the plaintiff, consequent to release of the film, to damages. It specifically states that, in the event of a change of circumstance after release of the film, the plaintiff could re-apply for injunction. That is precisely what the plaintiff has done by way of IA 10551/2021. In terms of para 43, therefore, this Bench has necessarily to examine and decide the said application on its own merits. 14.6 Secondly, the judgment of Narula, J. was rendered at a time when no film was in existence. Narula, J. was examining the matter as a quia timet action. The considerations which apply to a quia timet action are fundamentally different from those which apply to a prayer for injunction made after the allegedly tortious act is committed. It would be fundamentally erroneous, therefore, for this Bench to proceed on the basis of findings and observations returned by Narula, J., while examining the quia timet injunction application of the plaintiff when the film had not yet been released. 14.7 Thirdly, the order dated 26 July 2021, of the Division Bench, specifically states, in para 10, that the Division Bench had not examined the matter on merits. It goes without saying that, without examining the merits of the appeal before it, the Division Bench could Signature Not Verified Signed By:KAMLA CS(COMM) RAWAT Signing Date:12.07.2023 10:10:24 187/2021 Page 12 of 68