USCA Case #14-5004 Document #1570210 Filed: 08/28/2015 7 protective order prohibiting him from sharing the Government’s disclosures with his client, the court’s postdisclosure decision about whether to dismiss the suit for lack of standing would surely signal to the terrorist whether his name was on the list of surveillance targets. 133 S. Ct. at 1149 n.4 (citations omitted). These considerations apply with equal force here, where the government has sought to maintain a similarly strategic silence regarding the scope of its bulk collection. It is true that Clapper came to the Court on review of cross-motions for summary judgment, not a preliminary injunction, but the Court’s rejection of the Clapper plaintiffs’ claims is nonetheless telling. Those plaintiffs actually faced a lighter burden than do ours: in granting the government’s motion for summary judgment, the Court necessarily found that plaintiffs’ inferences were inadequate even to preserve the question of standing as a “genuine issue.” See Amnesty Int’l USA v. McConnell, 646 F. Supp. 2d 633, 641 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)), vacated and remanded sub nom. Amnesty Int’l USA v. Clapper, 638 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 2011), rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013). Here, by contrast, plaintiffs must show a “substantial likelihood” of standing. Accordingly, I find that plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate a “substantial likelihood” that the government is collecting from Verizon Wireless or that they are otherwise suffering any cognizable injury. They thus cannot meet their burden to show a “likelihood of success on the merits” and are not entitled to a preliminary injunction. It remains possible that on remand plaintiffs will be able to collect evidence that would establish standing. Indeed, noting that the government was “uniquely in control of the facts, information, documents, and evidence regarding the Page 17 of 21