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character, so far as his character appears in that conduct, and no further. Third Exception.—Conduct of any person touching any public question.—It is not defamation to express in good faith any opinion whatever respecting the conduct of any person touching any public question, and respecting his character, so far as his character appears in that conduct, and no further. Fourth Exception.—Publication of reports of proceedings of courts.—It is not defamation to publish substantially true report of the proceedings of a Court of Justice, or of the result of any such proceedings. Explanation.—A Justice of the Peace or other officer holding an enquiry in open Court preliminary to a trial in a Court of Justice, is a Court within the meaning of the above section. Fifth Exception.—Merits of case decided in Court or conduct of witnesses and others concerned.—It is not defamation to express in good faith any opinion whatever respecting the merits of any case, civil or criminal, which has been decided by a Court of Justice, or respecting the conduct of any person as a party, witness or agent, in any such case, or respecting the character of such person, as far as his character appears in that conduct, and no further. Sixth Exception.—Merits of public performance.—It is not defamation to express in good faith any opinion respecting the merits of any performance which its author has submitted to the judgment of the public, or respecting the character of the author so far as his character appears in such performance, and no further. Explanation.—A performance may be submitted to the judgment of the public expressly or by acts on the part of the author which imply such submission to the judgment of the public. Seventh Exception.—Censure passed in good faith by person having lawful authority over another.—It is not defamation in a person having over another any authority, either conferred by law or arising out of a lawful contract made with that other, to pass in good faith any censure on the conduct of that other in matters to which such lawful authority relates. Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed By:ZEENAT PRAVEEN Signing Date:05.02.2024 16:25:50 CRL.M.C. 6347/2019 Page 24 of 50

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Kejriwal v. State of India

Case Law

Country

India

Country Location

Latitude: 23.078537445745496

Longitude: 78.60363571015989

Country Location (linked Case Law): India

Decision Date: Feb 5, 2024

Case Status: In progress

Case Outcome (Procedural)

Affirmed Lower Court

Keywords

Defamation / Reputation
Digital Rights
Political Expression
Social Media

Judicial Body: Appellate Court

Court Name: Delhi High Court

Case Number: CRL. M.C. 6347/2019

Case Summary: The Delhi High Court ruled that public figures (or persons with a large public following) who retweet or repost defamatory material on social media can prima facie attract liability for criminal defamation under Section 499 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC), which provides sufficient basis for summoning them to trial as accused. Arvind Kejriwal, the incumbent Chief Minister of Delhi, and the petitioner in this case, retweeted an allegedly defamatory tweet by a YouTuber, accusing the IT Cell of the ruling Bhartiya Janta Party (BJP) of corruption. A criminal defamation action was initiated against Kejriwal, and he was summoned by the presiding Trial Court. Kejriwal requested the Delhi High Court to quash the summoning order. In rejecting Kejriwal’s petition, the Delhi High Court reasoned that public figures must be held to a higher standard of accountability for their social media activity given their influence and ability to shape public opinion. The Court argued that, owing to their clout, public figures can inflict significant reputational injury by negligently reposting defamatory imputations and, therefore, should not be allowed to escape criminal liability merely for not authoring at-issue libelous material.

Case Significance: This ruling widens the scope of liability of public figures for criminal defamation. Seemingly, they can now be prosecuted for this offense simply for recirculating ostensibly defamatory material on social media, even without a showing of criminal intent to defame. From the judgment, it appears that intentionality is to be presumed when the person retweeting has significant influence or following. Obligating public figures to vet the authenticity of all content they repost could fetter their participation on social media and hamper the free exchange of information online, thereby chilling free expression. The Delhi High Court has also left the term “public figure” undefined, creating ambiguity regarding the applicability of its heightened accountability standard. This could result in a larger than intended section of the population self-censoring their social media activity to avoid prosecution.

This case did not set a binding or persuasive precedent either within or outside its jurisdiction. The significance of this case is undetermined at this point in time.

Related Caselaw (self)

Subramanian Swamy v. Union of India

Related Law

Source URL: Global Freedom of Expression

Collection

Columbia

Date Updated: Jul 19, 2024

Primary Documents

Judgment
English
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CYRILLA: Global Digital Rights Law

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Kejriwal v. State of India

Primary Documents

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