Scarborough v. Frederick Cnty. Sch. Bd. President regularly utilized the account as one of the "main vehicles for conducting official business." Id. at 231–32. 579 Against that backdrop, the Second Circuit analyzed the President's arguments, which were nearly identical the ones raised here. First, the court rejected the President's contention that, at the time he blocked the plaintiffs from his Twitter account, he "was exercising control over a private, personal account," or, stated differently, that he was not acting in his official capacity. Id. at 234. The court concluded that the account itself, at least after *579 his inauguration in 2017, was presented as belonging to the President of the United States, and that he and others used the account on a regular basis to communicate with the public about the administration, including administration policy and personnel changes. Id. at 235–36. Because the President's Twitter account had "interactive features open to the public, making public interaction a prominent feature of the account," these unique characteristics transformed what would otherwise be a private social-media platform into a public forum. Id. at 236. Although the court cautioned that "not every social media account operated by a public official is a government account," and that each case requires a "fact-specific inquiry," it nevertheless concluded that the President had exercised official state action in blocking the plaintiffs from Twitter. Id. Next, the court rejected the President's argument that his Twitter account was not a public forum, concluding that since the President became a government official, he purposefully opened his once-private account for public discussion, regularly used it "as an official vehicle for governance," and "made its interactive features accessible to the public without limitation." Id. at 237. Finally, the court held, in line with the Fourth Circuit's conclusion in Davison , that the President's act of blocking his critics from his Twitter page amounted to impermissible censorship and unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination. See id. at 238–39. 517 F. Supp. 3d 569 (W.D. Va. 2021) Scarborough has stated a viable First Amendment claim against Sovine and Angelo. First, Scarborough has established that her attempted interaction with Sovine's and Angelo's Twitter accounts constituted protected First Amendment activity. See Knight , 302 F. Supp. 3d at 550 (recognizing that following someone on Twitter enables an individual to engage in a variety of expressive activity, including interacting with other followers about Tweets and replying to and commenting on content). Second, Scarborough's allegations that these public officials operated their Twitter accounts in their official capacities support the inference that, at a minimum, these platforms are limited public forums triggering some level of First Amendment protection. Third, the sequence of events alleged in the Second Amended Complaint—Scarborough's critical Facebook comments, followed by deletion of those comments and being blocked from FCPS's Facebook Page, and later by being blocked from the superintendents' Twitter pages—supports the critical inference that Sovine and Angelo removed her from these social-media platforms as a result of her criticism of their policies and initiation of this lawsuit. In other words, Scarborough has sufficiently alleged that they engaged in viewpoint discrimination. Finally, like the plaintiffs in Knight , Scarborough adequately alleges that both administrators operate their Twitter accounts in their official capacities as the chief administrators for the school system. Although her assertion is conclusory, it is adequate to satisfy her threshold burden of alleging official action in support of her First Amendment claim. The ultimate determination of whether the administrators operated these Twitter accounts in their official capacities will be fact specific and require Scarborough to develop evidence through discovery about the provenance and history of those accounts, including their registrations, the labels and markers associated with them, and the manner and frequency with which Defendants utilize them to conduct and promote school 7